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I. INTRODUCTION
For individuals and organizations facing financial distress,
modern bankruptcy law provides a statutory respite from creditors
and mounting debt. When a debtor's liabilities irretrievably exceed its
available assets, the law provides a forum for interested parties to
efficiently assess and equitably divide or restructure a maximized pie
of debtor value. What happens, however, when an individual or
corporate debtor, either through fraud or mistake, "hides" a piece of
the pie?
Debtors Mr. and Mrs. Hudspeath, facing significant financial
hardship, decided to contemplate their dire economic situation aboard
a chartered boat.1 As Mr. Hudspeath boarded the vessel, however, he
sustained physical injury due to the boat operator's allegedly negligent
maintenance of a slippery gangplank. Seeking to prevent this
potentially valuable lawsuit from falling into creditors' hands, the
Hudspeaths filed for bankruptcy but cagily omitted to disclose as an
asset their potential negligence suit against the boat operators.
During the ensuing bankruptcy proceedings, the Hudspeaths falsely
represented that any such negligence action would be barred by the
statute of limitations. This induced the bankruptcy trustee to
formally abandon any interest in the cause of action. As a result,
under personal bankruptcy law as it existed at the time, the
Hudspeaths received a no asset discharge from debt and emerged from
bankruptcy with a clean slate.
Upon receiving their discharge, the Hudspeaths promptly
proceeded to initiate their unbarred negligence lawsuit against the
1. These facts are based upon the recent Fifth Circuit case of Superior Crewboats, Inc., v.
Primary P & I Underwriters, (In re Superior Crewboats, Inc.), 374 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2004).
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boat operator, much to the dismay of the bankruptcy trustee who
moved to reopen the bankruptcy case and substitute as plaintiff in the
action. Amid this tussling, the defendant boat operator learned of the
Hudspeaths' omission of the lawsuit in their earlier bankruptcy and
consequently moved for dismissal under the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. 2 Seeing what it perceived to be the Hudspeaths' fraudulent
conduct, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the
Hudspeaths' negligence claim entirely. Thus, justice was served and
the Hudspeaths were prevented from manipulating judicial machinery
for their own private gain. The court punished the Hudspeaths for
hiding a piece of the pie by simply throwing the piece away.
Significant questions arise, however, about which interests
such a decision truly serves. Because the tort claim was dismissed,
the Hudspeaths' creditors remain unpaid and unable to benefit from
this legitimate cause of action that should have entered the
bankruptcy estate. In addition, the negligent boat operator escapes
unscathed and continues operating to the potential injury of future
customers. Simple dismissal of the claim in accordance with the
purportedly equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel has prevented these
third parties from seeking or receiving justice they potentially
deserve.
In modern litigation, disputes often arise that affect not merely
two directly adversarial parties, but also countless other parties with
varying degrees of interest. Perhaps nowhere is this trend more
clearly seen than in the bankruptcy law setting where multiple
parties' claims create an interconnected web in which a loss or
recovery by one reverberates throughout. In such a setting, applying
the doctrine of judicial estoppel presents unique challenges to parties
and to the court.
Courts frequently invoke judicial estoppel under the auspices of
protecting the machinery of justice and preventing perversion of the
judicial system. Yet applying the doctrine in a complex, multi-party
scenario may ultimately result in further dysfunction of the system
and inequity to the parties. Recent bankruptcy court decisions
invoking the doctrine represent prime examples of this predicament. 3
Bankruptcy proceedings of all varieties require, and indeed are
predicated upon, a full disclosure of all the debtor's assets.4 This
disclosure encompasses all assets a party may possess, including
2. Broadly, judicial estoppel serves to prevent a party that has asserted a position before a
tribunal from asserting the contrary before a subsequent tribunal.
3. See, e.g., Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d
314 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussed infra Part IV.A.2).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006) (discussed infra Part III).
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potential causes of action.5 In disclosing an asset schedule, a debtor
implicitly represents to the court that no other assets exist.
Occasionally, however, after filing its bankruptcy petition, the debtor
will initiate causes of action about which it knew prior to filing but
simply omitted to schedule as assets. In doing so, the debtor adopts a
position inconsistent with its earlier implicit representation in
bankruptcy that no such claim existed.
When the astute post-bankruptcy defendant realizes that the
plaintiff has previously represented that its cause of action did not
exist, frequently the defendant will attempt to achieve dismissal of the
action by asserting judicial estoppel. Courts have generally been
receptive to this argument and have often granted dismissal on that
basis.6 In a bankruptcy nondisclosure setting, however, estopping a
debtor from proceeding with an undisclosed claim may be an
inequitable and inefficient remedy. In particular, this approach
deprives the bankruptcy creditors of any proceeds resulting from the
undisclosed cause of action, and the potentially culpable third party
defendant evades liability merely because of the fortuitous actions of
the plaintiff in an unrelated proceeding.
While others have commented on the application of judicial
estoppel in the bankruptcy nondisclosure setting,7 this Note presents a
comprehensive analysis of the competing motivations and provides a
unified framework for balancing them. This Note begins by exploring
the motivations, practice, and implications of the doctrine of judicial
estoppel based on prior omissions in bankruptcy proceedings. Part II
provides background and reviews the underpinnings and broad goals
of bankruptcy law as well as the application of judicial estoppel in the
federal courts. Part III presents the prototypical pathological scenario
courts often confront that places the bankruptcy and judicial estoppel
at ideological odds; and Part IV describes various approaches that
courts have taken to resolve the conflicts. Part V analyzes the
competing goals and interests at stake in various bankruptcy
scenarios and critiques the manner in which courts have addressed
them. Part VI presents a generalized framework for resolving
doctrinal tensions in a manner most consistent with the goals of the
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1988)
(discussed infra Part IV.A.2).
7. See, e.g., Louis M. Phillips & Brandon A. Brown, Continuing Ruminations on Judicial
Estoppel: Barging into the Consumer Field, 2 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 4 (2004) (proposing a
method of analyzing standing in personal bankruptcy nondisclosure cases); Donna T. Snow,
Eleventh Circuit takes Another Look at Judicial Estoppel and Gets it Right, 7 NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER 3 (2004) (discussing Parker v. Wendy's Int'l., Inc., 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004)).
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competing interests at work in the corporate and personal bankruptcy
settings. Finally, Part VII summarizes these concepts and draws
conclusions about future application.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Goals of Judicial Estoppel
As courts have aptly noted, the doctrine of judicial estoppel
stands for different principles in different jurisdictions. In a recent
case, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Court of Appeals explained,
"Modern judicial estoppel doctrine is still amorphous and has been
described.., as 'not so much a single doctrine as a set of doctrines
that have not emerged into fully coherent theory."'8  To present as
coherent an image of judicial estoppel as possible, this Note first
develops the general principle of judicial estoppel as contrasted with
various other forms of preclusion. Next, the history and branching
development of the doctrine are examined to provide insight into the
goals motivating the varied approaches that courts apply to judicial
estoppel. Thus, this analysis reductively clarifies what judicial
estoppel is not; then, it pieces together what courts have created under
the umbrella term judicial estoppel.
1. Judicial Estoppel in Contrast to Other Forms of Preclusion
Irrespective of the specific requirements and policies guiding
its implementation, the term "judicial estoppel" broadly refers to
judicially-imposed limitations on litigants who would assert two
irreconcilable positions in successive litigations.9  As such, the
doctrine typically focuses on the parties' assertions in relation to the
courts rather than in relation to other litigants. Further, judicial
estoppel is an equitable doctrine. As one court explained, the term
equitable in this context refers not to the technical distinction between
law and equity, but rather to concerns of "fairness" and "preventing
injustice."10 This broad description serves to distinguish the doctrine
at least in principle from other forms of preclusion raised in litigation.
8. An-Tze Cheng v. K & S Diversified Invs. (In re An-Tze Cheng), 308 B.R. 448, 453 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4477 (2002) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER]).
9. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 8, § 4477.
10. An-Tze Cheng, 308 B.R. at 459.
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In contrast to judicial estoppel, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel generally requires that a party to a prior proceeding has
detrimentally relied on the prior inconsistent position of his
adversary." Equitable estoppel thus focuses primarily on a litigant's
prior positions with respect to other litigants rather than with respect
to the courts. Judicial estoppel's focus on judicial reliance serves to
distinguish it from equitable estoppel which focuses on reliance by an
opposing party.12
The doctrine of res judicata differs from judicial estoppel in
that it prohibits relitigation as between the original parties of "all
grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to
the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in
the prior proceeding."'13 The doctrine of res judicata applies primarily
to ensure the finality of litigation in which the court has rendered an
ultimate judgment. As such, res judicata forecloses "successive
litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the
claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit."'14 Although res
judicata and judicial estoppel share this process-based focus, res
judicata is readily distinguishable in that it applies only to successive
litigation of the same claim by the same parties and requires a final
judgment of the court on the matter.
Finally, the doctrine of collateral estoppel enables a party to
avoid relitigating issues that 1) the party had litigated in a prior
proceeding and 2) which were decided on as part of the final
judgment. 15 By invoking this doctrine, litigants in subsequent--even
unrelated-litigation can import the previous adjudication of the
issue. Though closely related to judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel
differs in significant ways. First, whereas collateral estoppel requires
that a party actually litigated an issue on which the court rendered a
final decision, judicial estoppel generally requires only some lesser
form of judicial adoption or reliance. 16  Further, unlike judicial
estoppel, collateral estoppel applies only to issues on which a decision
was necessary in order to determine the outcome of the prior
litigation.
11. See id. at 453 (discussing the approaches to equitable estoppel, which generally requires
either the court or a party to a prior proceeding to rely on the prior position).
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (8th ed. 2004).
13. Douglas W. Henkin, Judicial Estoppel-Beating Swords Into Shields and Back Again,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1718 (1991) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)).
14. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001).
15. WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 4416.
16. Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that, unlike collateral
estoppel, judicial estoppel does not require that the parties actually litigated the issue to be
precluded).
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2. Historical Development of Judicial Estoppel
The origin of judicial estoppel in American law can be traced
back to 1857 in the Tennessee Supreme Court case of Hamilton v.
Zimmerman.17 In that case, the plaintiff had testified in prior
litigation that he was a clerk for a business concern rather than a
partner, but then sought to testify in Hamilton that he was, in fact, a
full partner. In its ruling the court placed great emphasis on
protecting the sanctity of the judicial oath. This initial ruling thus
presented a strict version of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The
Tennessee court outlined its priorities by concluding, "[t]he chief
security and safeguard for the purity and efficiency of the
administration of justice is to be found in the proper reverence for the
sanctity of an oath."'8
Significantly, this formulation of the doctrine requires not that
the litigant succeed or that the court adopt the averred position, but
rather only that the statement be sworn under oath. By protecting
the sanctity of statements sworn under judicial oath absolutely and
without regard for mitigating concerns, Tennessee created a doctrine
that protected the judiciary process against perceived ills, but
potentially at the expense of other equitable concerns. Today, only
Tennessee continues to apply the doctrine in its strictest form, as
enunciated in Hamilton, wherein a party is forever barred from
contradicting a position averred under oath.19
As the doctrine has grown in application, other jurisdictions
have attached various conditions mitigating the absolute ruling in
Hamilton.20 Forty years after Hamilton, the United States Supreme
Court recognized judicial estoppel but embraced it on terms different
from those in Hamilton. In Davis v. Wakelee, the plaintiff, Davis, had
obtained dismissal of a bankruptcy objection in a prior proceeding by
asserting one position, but then sought to assert the contrary to serve
17. Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857).
18. Id. at 48.
19. Randy G. Boyers, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel,
80 N.W. U. L. REV. 1244, 1251 (1986). In continuing to apply the doctrine, however, even
Tennessee appellate courts have hinted at softening its application, stating for example:
"Although some policy concerns may have changed since Hamilton was decided just prior to the
Civil War, the goal of promoting truth in sworn testimony is as viable today as it was 150 years
ago." Chandler v. D. Canale & Co., No. W2000-02067-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 568027, at *5 (Tenn.
Ct. App. May 25, 2001).
20. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing an alternate formulation of
judicial estoppel which focuses on intent and good faith in addition to reliance).
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his interests in the matter before the court. 21 In finding against
Davis, the Court ruled that
[ilt may be laid down as a general proposition that, where a party assumes a certain
position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not,
thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position,
especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position
formerly taken. 
2 2
This holding represented a more limited prohibition than the
Tennessee court adopted in Hamilton. Rather than enforcing absolute
sanctity of positions taken under oath, the Court in Davis asserted
more narrowly that where a court accepts a party's position, the party
may not assert the contrary position in subsequent litigation to suit
the party's changing interests.
Following this pronouncement, the Supreme Court did not
specifically address the doctrine of judicial estoppel again for over 100
years until two cases in 1999 and 2001. During the interim, state and
federal circuit courts developed diverse applications of the doctrine
that ranged from strict application to outright refusal to apply the
doctrine at all.23 The Supreme Court's two modern judicial estoppel
cases have clarified certain tenets of the doctrine, but leave open many
of the details of its application. The Court's 1999 ruling settled only a
minor issue of judicial estoppel law not relevant to this analysis. 24 In
2001, however, the Court more broadly articulated the modern
doctrine.
In 2001, the Court reexamined the broad issue of judicial
estoppel in New Hampshire v. Maine.25 In that case, the state of
Maine sought to judicially estop the state of New Hampshire from
asserting a position contrary to one which it had asserted in prior
21. Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 685 (1895).
22. Id. at 689. It is worth noting that in outlining this estoppel principle, neither the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Hamilton, nor the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis employed the term
"judicial estoppel." Courts and commentators, however, have properly viewed these early
estoppel applications as laying the framework for doctrine now widely recognized in state and
federal courts as judicial estoppel. See, e.g., Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc., 591 S.E.2d
870, 884-86 (N.C. 2004) (tracing the history of the modern judicial estoppel doctrine).
23. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit's reluctance to
apply judicial estoppel in Kostantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
24. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 796 (1999) (narrowly holding
that judicial estoppel applied to plaintiffs bringing clams under the Americans with Disabilities
Act). In confining its ruling strictly to the parties' legal positions concerning the ADA dispute,
the court recognized the broader ambiguities in circuit courts' application of judicial estoppel but
chose to "leaveo the law related to the former, purely factual, kind of conflict where we found it."
Id. at 802. Thus, no generally applicable rules were drawn out.
25. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
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litigation concerning the states' geographical boundaries.26 The Court
first noted the uniform conclusion reached by other courts that the
purpose of judicial estoppel is to "protect the integrity of the judicial
process."27 The Court then laid out several guidelines that "typically
inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine" including (1)
whether a party's later position is "clearly inconsistent" with its
earlier position; (2) whether a party succeeded in persuading a court
to accept the earlier position; and (3) "whether the party seeking to
assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or
impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped." 28
In addition to this enumeration, the Court noted that, in the case at
bar, the inconsistency did not result from inadvertence. 29 Finally, the
Court concluded, "In short, considerations of equity persuade us that
the application of judicial estoppel is appropriate in this case."30
The Court in New Hampshire stopped well short of definitively
sculpting the doctrine, however, emphasizing that "[i]n enumerating
these factors, we do not establish inflexible prerequisites or an
exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial
estoppel. Additional concerns may inform the doctrine's
application. ... 31 Indeed, the Court prefaced its remarks with the
observation that "[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel
may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any
general formulation of principle."32 Thus, New Hampshire v. Maine
clarified the general motivation of the doctrine and provided guidance
to the circuit courts in applying it but eschewed providing a strict
definition. Consequently, several issues remain open.
In addition to Tennessee's strict judicial estoppel application in
Hamilton and the Supreme Court's multi-factor approach in New
Hampshire, this Note identifies a third broad approach to judicial
26. The underlying dispute in the case centered on whether the border between New
Hampshire and Maine ran along the Maine shoreline of the Piscataqua river, thereby granting
New Hampshire the entire river and Portsmouth Harbor, or along the middle of the river,
effectively splitting disputed territory between the two states. Id. at 1812. In unrelated litigation
from 1977, New Hampshire had settled on terms interpreting a 1740 decree of King George II to
indicate that the border, in fact, ran along the middle of the river. Id. at 1813. The Court
approved that 1977 settlement as a viable interpretation of the 1740 decree. Id. The court held
that the position asserted by New Hampshire in 1977 judicially estopped New Hampshire from
making the inconsistent assertion in 2001 that the border actually ran along the Maine
shoreline. See id. at 751-55.
27. Id. at 749-50 (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982)).
28. Id. at 750-51 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 753.
30. Id. at 755.
31. Id. at 751.
32. Id. at 750 (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)).
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estoppel adopted by several circuit courts. Both before and after New
Hampshire, some courts have relied primarily on a "fast and loose"
formulation of judicial estoppel that primarily seeks to prevent
litigants from "playing fast and loose with the courts" through
deliberate manipulation.33  Courts applying the "fast and loose"
formulation still examine the first two New Hampshire elements that
require assertion of contradictory positions, and judicial adoption of
the initial position asserted.34 The "fast and loose" construction,
however, additionally focuses on whether the change in position is
tainted by bad faith. 35 Although the Supreme Court touched on
"inadvertence" in New Hampshire, the Court did not specifically
include intent in its multi-factor analysis; by contrast, the "fast and
loose" approach centers on an intent or bad faith inquiry. 36 Although
the third New Hampshire element concerning whether a party has
gained an unfair advantage often informs this intent inquiry, the "fast
and loose" formulation focuses on a party's knowledge and the motives
underlying its contradictory assertions.3 7 Thus, while introducing an
additional intent-based element, this version of the doctrine shares
33. Scarano v. Central R. R. Co. 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).
34. See Hon. William Houston Brown et al., Debtors' Counsel Beware: Use of the Doctrine of
Judicial Estoppel in Nonbankruptcy Forums, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 202-03 (2001) (describing
contradictory assertions as the central tenet of the doctrine as applied by all courts). Initially,
some "fast and loose" formulations were seen as omitting any requirement that a party must
have succeeded in persuading a court to adopt its initial position. See Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513
(stating that the "use of inconsistent positions ... has been emphasized as an evil the courts
should not tolerate"); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying the Scarano principle of judicial estoppel); see also Stevens Technical Services,
Inc. v. S.S. Brooklyn 885 F.2d 584, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing Scarano and Patriot
Cinemas as standing for the "minority view" that judicial estoppel applies to a party playing "fast
and loose" "notwithstanding that [the] party was not successful" in asserting its first position).
Among jurisdictions articulating the "fast and loose" approach, however, some form of judicial
reliance appears to remain a requirement. Since Patriot Cinemas, for example, the First Circuit
has expressly clarified that some form of judicial adoption is required to invoke judicial estoppel.
Gens v. Resolution Trust Corp., 112 F.3d 569, 572-73 (1st Cir. 1997). Similarly, since Scarano,
the Third Circuit has expressly joined "the consensus view among [its] sister circuits" that
judicial adoption of the earlier position is required. Montrose Med. Group Participating Sav. Plan
v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 780, 782 & nn.4, 6 (3d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases from the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits adopting the same requirement).
35. See Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513 (examining contradictory assertions for evidence of intent
to play "fast and loose" with the courts); Patriot Cinemas, 834 F.2d at 212 (same).
36. See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining the Supreme Court's attention to inadvertence in
judicial estoppel analysis).
37. See, e.g., Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d
Cir. 1996) ("Whether the party sought to be estopped benefited from its earlier position or was
motivated to seek such a benefit may be relevant insofar as it evidences an intent to play fast
and loose with the courts."). The Third Circuit recently reaffirmed this view in Krystal, a post-
New Hampshire case discussed in Part IV, infra. Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 361).
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the goal of guarding the public image of the judiciary that the
Supreme Court alluded to in New Hampshire v. Maine.38 Several
circuits, including the First, Third, and Fifth, have cited this "fast and
loose" construct when focusing on a party's intent in the determining
whether judicial estoppel is warranted, particularly in the bankruptcy
nondisclosure setting.
39
In contrast to the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, both the
District of Columbia Circuit and, until only recently, the Tenth Circuit
have refused to apply judicial estoppel at all. 40 In declining to apply
the doctrine, the D.C. Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit's reasoning,
characterizing judicial estoppel as "out of harmony with (the modern
rules of pleading) and [warning that it] would discourage the
determination of cases on the basis of the true facts as they might be
established ultimately."41 Although, at the time the D.C. Circuit noted
that judicial estoppel had not been adopted in "anything approaching"
a majority of jurisdictions, 42 a clear majority has since adopted the
doctrine. 4
3
Although other details of the doctrine's application vary across
jurisdictions, these variations do not directly affect the analysis of the
conflicting judicial goals presented here. Such details include whether
state or federal judicial estoppel law applies in certain circumstances,
and whether the contradictory assertion element encompasses both
factually as well as legally inconsistent positions. This analysis
focuses on the policy goals served by the three primary versions of
judicial estoppel discussed: the Tennessee strict application in
Hamilton, the Supreme Court's multifactor approach in New
Hampshire emphasizing judicial reliance, and the "fast and loose"
38. 532 U.S. 742, 755 (2001) (explaining that "[w]e cannot interpret "Middle of the River" in
the 1740 decree to mean two different things along the same boundary line without undermining
the integrity of the judicial process").
39. See Gens, 112 F.3d at 572-73 (concluding that estoppel is appropriate where "intentional
self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for
suitors seeking justice"); Montrose, 243 F.3d at 782 n.6 (focusing on a party's intention to play
fast and loose with the courts); Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197,
203, 205-06, 210-11 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting a knowledge and motive standard for applying
judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy non-disclosure context).
40. See Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956) (refusing to adopt the
doctrine of judicial estoppel); Kostantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (applying the
reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Parkinson). But see Johnson v. Lindon City Corp., 405 F.3d
1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging the Tenth Circuit's repeated refusal to recognize
judicial estoppel, but nevertheless applying the doctrine in light of New Hampshire).
41. Kostantinidis, 626 F.2d at 938 (quoting Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 438).
42. Id.
43. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing cases from seven circuits applying
the doctrine of judicial estoppel).
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intent analysis that has evolved in jurisdictions including the First,
Third, and Fifth Circuits.
B. Policy Goals Underlying the Tenets of Bankruptcy Law
Bankruptcy law provides the means for an insolvent debtor to
obtain financial relief by undertaking a judicially supervised
liquidation or plan of payment for the benefit of creditors. 44
Academics have long debated the most fundamental aspects of modern
bankruptcy law including the relative merits of its very existence. 45
For purposes of analysis, however, this Note forgoes that normative
debate and focuses instead on policy goals that current bankruptcy
law endeavors to further. Here, some common ground can be found
among many courts and scholars in the notion that bankruptcy law
serves several important goals by creating a mechanism to deal with
financially distressed debtors. First, though many individuals and
entities will never undergo bankruptcy, the structure of bankruptcy
law is meant to facilitate optimal choices for business entities ex
ante. 46 In addition, where an entity does enter bankruptcy, the law
facilitates ex post optimization of the value of the entity.47 Finally,
economic analysis of bankruptcy law exhorts accomplishing the first
two goals as efficiently as possible. 48
Within the ex post bankruptcy realm, various doctrines have
emerged that are often cited as additional sub-goals of bankruptcy
law. Some policies, such as requiring full disclosure of a debtor's
assets49 and protecting the debtor from outside claims while in
bankruptcy,5 0 follow directly from the overarching goal of economic
efficiency. As a result, these policies will not be assessed as ends
justifiable in their own right; rather they will be discussed within the
context of economic efficiency.
Beneath the general bankruptcy banner, significant differences
emerge in the policy goals that motivate bankruptcy law in the
44. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 156 (8th ed. 2004).
45. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 775-77 (1987)
(discussing opposing views on the purpose served by bankruptcy law).
46. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co. v.
Southmark Corp. (In re Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., Inc.), 139 F.3d 702, 706 (9th Cir.
1998) (discussing the debtor's obligations with respect to option contracts entered into prior to
filing for bankruptcy).
47. See id. (stating that "maximizing the estate's value" serves the goals of bankruptcy law).
48. Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 86 (1995).
49. Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1999).
50. Bronson v. U.S., 46 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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personal and corporate arenas. Social policy goals color many
interpretations of personal bankruptcy law. The Supreme Court, for
example, has repeatedly articulated the dual aims of satisfying debts
owed to creditors and providing a fresh start for "honest" debtors
through bankruptcy proceedings. 51  Recent changes in personal
bankruptcy law, however, have shifted this emphasis toward requiring
a modicum of debt payment where practicable for at least five years,
as well as mandatory personal credit counseling to spur greater
consumer responsibility.
52
Distinct from the personal bankruptcy setting, there is no
"fresh start" for a corporate debtor. In the case of a corporation,
bankruptcy focuses on maximizing value among competing interests
including secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders.
Corporate bankruptcy provides a forum for interested parties to create
a plan that maximizes returns either through total or partial
liquidation of the organization; or, a bankruptcy plan requires
reorganization and continuation of the firm's operation to capture the
going concern value by restructuring the firm's debt and equity.53 In
addition, bankruptcy law establishes priority rules to ensure that
distribution aligns with ex-ante expectations. 54  In the case of
reorganization, bankruptcy law facilitates collective creditor action to
restructure firm management as well as debt obligations to best
exploit firm value.
55
Various other bankruptcy principles and policies have been
proposed regarding corporate reorganizations including the
preservation of jobs, concern for surrounding communities, and
equitable distribution among competing creditors.56 Apart from the
broad economic goals stated at the outset, however, such policies tend
to describe the desired effects of bankruptcy law rather than ends
economically justifiable in their own right.57 Such concerns do not
tend to color the primary goals at stake in the issue presented. As a
result, these concerns which divert the focus from economic
maximization are subordinated for purposes of the following analysis.
51. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(g)(1) (2006).
53. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 38-39 (3d
ed. rev. 2001).
54. Id. at 453-54.
55. Id. at 38-39.
56. See Warren, supra note 45, at 787-88 (1987).
57. Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994).
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III. LAYING OUT THE PROBLEM OF NONDISCLOSURE
This Part lays the statutory groundwork for disclosure in
bankruptcy and presents the prototypical scenario of a debtor's
nondisclosure of potentially valuable causes of action in bankruptcy.
First, statutory bankruptcy disclosure obligations are outlined, and
the intersection with the judicial estoppel doctrine is presented. Next,
a debtor's potential motives to conceal a claim are explored and the
various common nondisclosure scenarios are explained. Finally, the
rules governing when a debtor has standing to bring undisclosed
bankruptcy claims are set forth.
A. Disclosure Obligations and Judicial Estoppel: the Prototypical
Scenario
Though the doctrine of judicial estoppel has no intrinsic
relationship to the law of bankruptcy; the two bodies of law often
collide in ways that force courts to balance opposing goals and
motivations. In a typical case, a debtor unable to meet its obligations
files for protection under bankruptcy law. In the course of the ensuing
proceedings, the Bankruptcy Code imposes strict disclosure
obligations on the debtor, principally through two sections. 58 First, as
to all debtors in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) requires that a debtor
file a "schedule of assets and liabilities ... and a statement of the
debtor's financial affairs."59  Second, under 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b),
organizational debtors filing under Chapter 11 must submit a specific
disclosure statement containing "adequate information."60  Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 541, property of the estate in bankruptcy specifically
includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
58. Benjamin J. Vernia, Annotation, Judicial Estoppel of Subsequent Action Based on
Statements, Positions, or Omissions as to Claim or Interest in Bankruptcy Proceeding, 85 A.L.R.
5TH 353 (2001).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii) (Supp. 2005). The
2005 amendments retain this language under amended 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(1)(B)(i) and
521(a)(1)(B)(iii). In addition, the amended statute further requires debtors to file "a statement
disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in income or expenditures over the 12-month
period following the date of the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(vi) (2006). As
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 521 imposes even greater and more specific disclosure obligations.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (b) (2006). Section 1125(a) defines adequate information as:
[I]nformation of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in
light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books
and records, that would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of
claims or interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
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the commencement of the case."6 1 This language broadly encompasses
a duty to schedule all existing contingent or unliquidated claims or
causes of action.
62
An intersection between judicial estoppel and bankruptcy law
often arises when a debtor files and the court accepts these required
disclosures. The first prong of the judicial estoppel doctrine
enunciated by the Court in New Hampshire v. Maine queries whether
the positions taken in the different proceedings are truly
contradictory; the second prong requires that a party succeed in
persuading a court to accept a position.63  Where a debtor in
bankruptcy files the required disclosures and the court proceeds on
the basis thereof, subsequent courts generally find the judicial
acceptance requirement satisfied. 64 Thus, should a defendant to a
subsequent claim raise a judicial estoppel defense where the debtor
has asserted a position contrary to that represented in earlier
bankruptcy disclosures, most courts will find both the first and second
prong of the New Hampshire test satisfied. 65 As a result, much of the
analysis in such cases centers on the third prong that inquires
whether the party gains an advantage (or whether the defendant
suffers an unfair detriment) through nondisclosure.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006).
62. Brown et al., supra note 34, 202-03; see also Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal
Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing precedent to support the principle that
"the Bankruptcy Code and Rules impose upon bankruptcy debtors an express, affirmative duty
to disclose all assets, including contingent and unliquidated claims" and that "the importance of
this disclosure duty cannot be overemphasized"). In addition, recent amendments to the
bankruptcy code now provide for strict punishment in certain cases where a debtor fails to meet
the disclosure obligations. For example, amended section 521(j) provides that where:
an individual debtor in a voluntary case under chapter 7 or 13 fails to file all of the
information required under subsection (a)(1) within 45 days after the date of the filing
of the petition, the case shall be automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day
after the date of the filing of the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 521(j). Since this amendment has only recently taken effect, it is unclear whether
courts will apply it to a nondisclosure scenario in which the plaintiff has filed the forms required
under § 521(a)(1) but omitted to include a cause of action as an asset. This provision likely would
not apply to the bulk of the cases addressed in this Note as they pertain to closed Chapter 7 and
post-confirmation Chapter 11 and 13 cases. Where a failure to disclose is detected during the
pendency of a Chapter 13 case, however, this provision could be interpreted strictly to effect an
automatic dismissal.
63. 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001).
64. See, e.g., In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d at 210.
65. See, e.g., Superior Crewboats, Inc., v. Primary P & I Underwriters, (In re Superior
Crewboats, Inc.), 374 F.3d 330, 335 (discussed supra Part 1); Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC
Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussed infra Part III.A.2).
Where the bankruptcy case is later dismissed, the effect on judicial estoppel application is
unclear, especially with regard to courts emphasizing the "judicial adoption" element or
requiring success on the merits. Such a scenario falls outside the scope of this analysis, however,
which focuses on bankruptcy cases in which third party rights are at stake.
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This interaction between judicial estoppel and bankruptcy
arises under a wide variety of disclosure and subsequent contradiction
scenarios. Disclosures or other positions that a debtor adopts in
bankruptcy proceedings relating to the secured status of debts; the
priority of debts; and the personal, partnership, or corporate nature of
the debt may all serve as fodder for a later judicial estoppel claim if
contradicted in subsequent litigation.66 An issue consistently disputed
in subsequent litigation, however, arises when a debtor omits to
schedule a legal cause of action, and then subsequently asserts the
cause of action after discharging debts through bankruptcy.
B. Motives for Nondisclosure: Individual vs. Corporate Debtors
Under the bankruptcy statutes, a corporate or individual
debtor's potential motivation to improperly omit fixed assets or
contingent legal claims from the required bankruptcy disclosures is
clear. Once disclosed, a legal claim becomes part of the estate in
bankruptcy like all other disclosed assets to be distributed by the
bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession to creditors. 67 Further,
contingent assets such as legal claims may be especially easy for a
debtor to successfully conceal from the purview of bankruptcy
proceedings. By effectively discharging all outstanding debt through
bankruptcy, the debtor paves the way to retain as windfall any
recovery subsequently gained through pursuit of the undisclosed
claims. Such a strategy essentially enables debtors to "[c]onceal
[their] claims; get rid of [their] creditors on the cheap, and start over
with a bundle of rights."68
In either the corporate or individual case, this intentional
nondisclosure scenario clearly breaks down into basic fraud. Seen
most obviously in the context of Chapter 7 individual bankruptcy, a
nondisclosing debtor improperly attempts to retain the full benefit of a
claim properly belonging to the estate and thus deprives unpaid
creditors of distributions through false representations. Recent
bankruptcy reform legislation aimed at consumers, however, employs
a means test to force the majority of individual debtors into a Chapter
13 repayment plan rather than providing for a discharge of payments
through Chapter 7.69 This push toward repayment may limit the
66. See Vernia, supra note 58, §§ 6, 16, 18 (discussing cases related to these issues).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C.S. § 521(a)(1) (2005).
68. Payless Wholesale Distribs., Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1st
Cir. 1993).
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2006) (describing when a court may dismiss a case or convert a
Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 11 or 13 case).
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incentive to conceal claims as any judgment obtained on a concealed
prepetition claim would likely accrue during the pendency of the
Chapter 13 case. 70 At least one court, however, has highlighted the
potential motive of a Chapter 13 debtor to conceal claims so as to
minimize the debtor's accounted assets and maximize the ultimate
planned discharge. 71  Regardless, such undisclosed claims in the
Chapter 13 context provide additional examples of the need to balance
the creditors' interests in fashioning a remedy for nondisclosure.
In the context of corporate debtors, a distinct set of concerns
arises. For corporate debtors reorganizing under Chapter 11, the
motivation to conceal causes of action depends upon the nature of the
corporate bankruptcy. Similar to individual bankruptcy, nondisclosure
of a cause of action by a corporate entity works to the detriment of
those seeking payment from the debtor. In the corporate context,
however, that group includes various stakeholders such as secured
creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders. Where a Chapter
11 reorganization retains the same management and equity holders as
it held prior to bankruptcy, the existing management of the firm has a
clear motive to conceal causes of action because that group would
stand in the position to most fully benefit from the windfall of
concealing causes of action from bankruptcy creditors.
Increasingly, however, in modern Chapter 11 cases, secured
creditors position themselves to be able to take over management of
an ailing corporation and to hold equity in the reorganized
corporation.72 In many instances, secured creditors may have already
installed their own management prior to petitioning or may use
Chapter 11 to implement a prearranged deal. 73 As a result, in such
scenarios it is the secured creditors that not only receive preferential
distributions in bankruptcy but also then position themselves, through
nondisclosure of potential causes of action, to monopolize the benefit of
recovery in the undisclosed action.
70. Unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy that closes upon liquidation, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
remains open until the established repayment plan is complete.
71. See De Leon v. Comcar Indus. Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that
"financial motive to secret assets exists under Chapter 13 as well as under Chapter 7 because the
hiding of assets affects the amount to be discounted and repaid").
72. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV.
673, 675, 682-85 (2003) (asserting that "[clorporate reorganizations today are the legal vehicles
by which creditors in control decide which course of action-sale, prearranged deal, or a
conversion of debt to a controlling equity stake-will maximize their return"); see also Elizabeth
Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (2003)
(highlighting the increasing influence of secured creditors on the outcome of Chapter 11
proceedings).
73. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 72, at 678.
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A third scenario exemplifies an additional motive for
nondisclosure in corporate cases. Often in Chapter 11 corporate
bankruptcies, residual claims such as recovery actions for fraudulent
transfers are placed into a liquidating trust that may be administered
for the benefit of creditors. 74 In Chapter 7 cases, those residual
claims, including potential causes of action, may be sold at auction as
"intangibles" for the benefit of the estate. 75 In a recent Fifth Circuit
case, the debtor corporation failed to disclose a potential cause of
action in its initial Chapter 11 petition but ultimately converted the
bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 76 Management of the defunct
firm, however, proceeded to create a new corporate entity and
indirectly repurchased the remnants of the old firm; only this time, it
specifically included the previously undisclosed cause of action in the
purchase. 77 The new company then filed the previously undisclosed
suit.78 As this scenario demonstrates, firm management may be
motivated to conceal claims both in a Chapter 7 liquidation scenario
as well as in a Chapter 11 reorganization.
Though many nondisclosure cases involve at least the
appearance of fraud, in some cases, a corporate or individual debtor
may fail to disclose a potential legal claim through simple
inadvertence or lack of knowledge. Lack of specific knowledge of a
claim, however, is insufficient to justify omission from disclosure. 79
The disclosure requirements are a fundamental principle of
bankruptcy law, and courts broadly interpret the duty to report
whenever a debtor has information that may merely suggest a cause of
action.80 When a debtor's omission truly results from inadvertence,
however-as opposed to simply an asserted lack of knowledge-courts
have indicated that the motivations informing a decision to allow
74. See WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 129:31 (2d ed.,
1994) ("[O]ften assets are transferred to a liquidating trust and a trustee is appointed who is
responsible for disposing of the assets; recovering preferential, fraudulent or other transfers; and
using the proceeds to pay creditors.").
75. See Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 203 (5th Cir.




79. See id. ("If the debtor has enough information ... prior to confirmation to suggest that it
may have a possible cause of action, then that is a 'known' cause of action such that it must be
disclosed.") (citation omitted).
80. See id. at 210-13 (discussing and analyzing several nondisclosure cases and ultimately
concluding that "in considering judicial estoppel for bankruptcy cases, the debtor's failure to
satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is 'inadvertent' only when, in general, the debtor either lacks
knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no motive for their concealment").
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pursuit of the claim weigh differently. This distinction is highlighted
in the case law analysis of a debtor's motive to conceal a claim.81
C. Debtor Standing to Assert Undisclosed Claims
Regardless of whether a court determines that judicial estoppel
bars an undisclosed claim, the debtor may not have legal standing to
pursue the claim based on procedural rules and bankruptcy law
principles. As a result, the analysis of standing becomes inextricably
intertwined with the application of judicial estoppel in bankruptcy
nondisclosure cases. Whereas earlier cases tended to ignore standing
in the application of judicial estoppel, modern cases focus more
carefully on the issue of standing.8 2 Since distinct standing issues
arise with respect to the various bankruptcy chapters, this Note
addresses each chapter in turn as background for the subsequent case
law analysis.
1. Chapter 7 Debtors
Assets scheduled pursuant to § 521, including legal claims,
become property of the estate as of the time the debtor files for
bankruptcy.83 Scheduled legal claims thus become property of the
estate as specifically provided under § 541.84 In Chapter 7 and other
cases in which a trustee is appointed to administer the estate, only the
trustee of the estate retains standing to pursue the scheduled claims
and succeeds to all transferable causes of action previously held by the
debtor.8 5 The trustee thus becomes the real party in interest to the
scheduled claims and may pursue them on behalf of the debtor under
81. See infra Part IV.A (discussing judicial analysis of intent in bankruptcy nondisclosure
scenarios).
82. Compare In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 207-08 (omitting to address standing) with
Parker v. Wendy's Int'l., Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (analyzing judicial estoppel
specifically with regard to standing).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006).
84. Id. § 541(a)(1) (requiring "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the case" to be included in the estate).
85. See Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272; see Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292
(11th Cir. 2003) (holding that other claims properly belonged to the bankruptcy estate because
they were filed before the bankruptcy petition); see also Snow, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing and
praising the lth Circuit's refusal to apply judicial estoppel in Parker). Significantly, not all
causes of action may be transferable to the trustee in bankruptcy. See Morlan v. Universal Guar.
Life Ins. Co., 298 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing whether or not an ERISA claim is




11 U.S.C. § 323.86 At the close of the bankruptcy proceedings,
however, any assets of the estate scheduled under § 521 "not
otherwise administered" are effectively abandoned by the estate under
11 U.S.C. § 554(c) and such assets revert back to the debtor.8 7 As a
result, scheduled claims that the estate abandons may transfer back
and again be pursued by the debtor post-bankruptcy.
When a debtor fails to schedule a claim at all, however, courts
have struggled with the application of standing and judicial estoppel
upon the debtor's subsequent assertion of the unscheduled claim.
Most courts that have examined the issue have taken the position that
an unscheduled claim cannot be implicitly abandoned by the estate, so
only the trustee retains standing to pursue it.88 A plaintiff seeking to
pursue such a cause of action may seek to reopen the prior bankruptcy
case and join or substitute the trustee. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350,
the bankruptcy court may, at its discretion, reopen a closed case in
order to "administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for some
other cause."8 9  As addressed below, this power has also produced
disagreement as to under what circumstances plaintiffs may
successfully reopen bankruptcy cases to schedule previously
undisclosed causes of action as scheduled assets. 90
2. Chapter 11 Debtors
Unlike the Chapter 7 scenario outlined above, a Chapter 11
debtor often acts simultaneously as a trustee for the estate and can
thus administer estate assets. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a), a so-
called debtor-in-possession performs "all the functions and duties ...
of a trustee." As a result, prior to confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, a
debtor-in-possession retains authority to add causes of action as assets
to the estate and to prosecute causes of action on behalf of the estate
pursuant to the debtor's trustee-like role.
Courts have diverged, however, on the issue of standing
following confirmation of a plan under Chapter 11 when a debtor
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2006) (explaining that the trustee is the representative of the
estate); 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) (2006) (specifying that, as a "representative of the estate", the trustee
has the "capacity to sue and be sued").
87. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (2006).
88. E.g., Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 ("[A] pre-petition cause of action is the property of the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee in bankruptcy has standing to pursue it."); see
also infra Part IV (presenting an in-depth analysis of courts' application of judicial estoppel in
the bankruptcy non-disclosure context).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2006).
90. See infra Part lV.B.4 (citing cases in which bankruptcy courts have allowed or refused
to reopen cases to administer an undisclosed cause of action).
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directly asserts claims it failed to disclose in bankruptcy. As a general
matter, courts have agreed that unscheduled assets cannot be
abandoned by the estate at the close of bankruptcy and thus remain
with the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 554.91 Yet in Chapter 11 cases, in
particular, the Bankruptcy Code provides that "confirmation of a plan
vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor. ' 92 The resolution
of this apparent conflict as to debtor standing in post-confirmation
Chapter 11 actions is described in detail in the case law analysis Part
below.
3. Chapter 13 Debtors
For purposes of a standing analysis, an individual Chapter 13
debtor is more analogous to a debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11
than to a debtor filing under Chapter 7. Unlike a Chapter 7 case in
which a trustee administers property of the estate in bankruptcy for
the benefit of creditors, under Chapter 13 the debtor himself is vested
with certain trustee powers under 11 U.S.C. § 1303. Further
analogous to the Chapter 11 framework, confirmation of a Chapter 13
plan "vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor."93  The
courts' interpretations of this directive in the context of a debtor's
failure to disclose a cause of action is addressed below in the case law
analysis of Chapter 13 debtor standing.
IV. ANALYZING THE COURTS' APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IN
THE BANKRUPTCY NONDISCLOSURE CONTEXT
This section presents an analysis of the manner in which
courts have dealt with bankruptcy nondisclosures and estoppel issues
in subsequent litigation. The analysis is intended to lay out the broad
themes that courts have adopted in analyzing such claims and for that
reason, is limited primarily to federal law. Many state courts, too,
have tackled bankruptcy nondisclosure cases, coming down on various
sides of the case law herein presented.9 4 Therefore, this case law
91. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Desmond 70 F.3d 183, 186 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Vreugdenhill
v. Navistar Int'l Transportation Corp., 950 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir.1991) (concluding that claims
undisclosed under § 554 remain property of the estate)).
92. 11 U.S.C § 1141(b) (2006).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2006).
94. See, e.g., Vincent v. First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1245-46 (Ala. 2003) (applying
judicial estoppel to causes of action a debtor failed to disclose in previous Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings); Ramsey v. Jonassen, 737 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing a
district court's application of judicial estoppel in a bankruptcy non-disclosure setting where the
defendant in the previously undisclosed action was not prejudiced by the omission in
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analysis is not presented as an exhaustive survey, but rather as an
outline of the approaches courts have taken in balancing the
motivations of the underlying doctrines.
Whether a debtor fails to disclose a potential legal claim
through a calculated strategy of deceit or through mere inadvertence,
courts must balance the competing interests in the subsequent
litigation. The interests of the bankruptcy creditors, the debtor, the
defendants in the undisclosed post-bankruptcy cause of action, and the
judicial system all must be taken into account. Courts have adopted a
variety of approaches in balancing those interests. An examination of
recent circuit court decisions reveals that, while no comprehensive
framework has developed to resolve the tensions between competing
interests, two interrelated factors have been primary in determining
the outcome of nondisclosed claim cases. First, when a bankruptcy
debtor is found to have omitted a claim, many courts focus their
analysis on the debtor's intent or motive to conceal the claim. Second,
courts increasingly examine standing in cases where a trustee has
been appointed to administer the estate in bankruptcy.
A. The Debtor's Intent: Punishing Bad Faith Omissions
The primary element of any judicial estoppel application
requires that a party assert one position before a tribunal and then
later assert a contradictory position.95 In its most basic sense, intent
in judicial estoppel cases refers to the party's purposeful assertion of
contradictory arguments. 96 In a non-bankruptcy case, the Supreme
Court applied judicial estoppel and announced generally applicable
principles without including intent as a primary consideration. 97 In
that case, however, the Court specifically noted that the contradictory
position in question was "not inadvertent" and emphasized that the
specific factors presented were not a comprehensive list. As noted
earlier, 98 many circuit courts adopting a "fast and loose" construction
bankruptcy); Period Homes, Ltd. v. Wallick, 569 S.E.2d 502, 504 (Ga. 2002) (declining to apply
judicial estoppel where the debtor possessed no motive to conceal claims because all creditors
were paid in full); WinMark Ltd. P'ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 693 A.2d 824, 831 (Md. 1997)
(declining to apply judicial estoppel where a Chapter 11 debtor asserts a previously undisclosed
cause of action post-petition).
95. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001).
96. See, e.g., Superior Crewboats, Inc., v. Primary P & I Underwriters, (In re Superior
Crewboats, Inc.), 374 F.3d 330, 335-36 (discussed supra Part I).
97. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750; see supra Part II.A.2 (presenting a thorough
discussion of New Hampshire).
98. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing disagreements among the circuits as to specific
elements of judicial estoppel).
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now employ an intent inquiry before applying judicial estoppel,
particularly in the bankruptcy nondisclosure setting.99 Various courts
however, have drawn different conclusions regarding the requisite
level of intent.
1. The First Circuit: An Implicit Intent Requirement
The First Circuit has taken perhaps the most unforgiving
approach in requiring only a minimal showing of intent to impose
judicial estoppel. Even early bankruptcy nondisclosure cases in the
First Circuit, however, appear to require some identifiable level of
intent. In Payless Wholesale Dist., Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc.,
Plaintiff Payless had opened a wholesale distributorship but suffered
numerous setbacks and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after just two
years of operation. 100 Some. time after filing for bankruptcy, Payless
filed a 110 page complaint outlining twenty distinct causes of action
alleging unlawful business transactions against former creditor
Alberto Culver (P.R) Inc. ("Culver"), which purportedly drove Payless
to bankruptcy. 10 1 The court emphasized that at no point during the
bankruptcy process or filings "did Payless even vaguely refer to the
present claims, or distinguish [Culver] from its other creditors.
'10 2
The court found Payless's silence as to its claims during the
bankruptcy proceedings "deafening," implying a finding of motive to
conceal.10 3 Additionally, the court emphasized the importance of full
disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings in order to protect not only the
subsequent defendants but also the court and other creditors.
10 4
Although acknowledging the fact that imposing judicial estoppel could
result in a windfall to defendants, the court nonetheless found judicial
estoppel necessary to prevent Payless's "unacceptable abuse of judicial
99. See Brown et al., supra note 34, at 223, 225-26 (explaining the various approaches taken
to analyzing the intent element in applying judicial estoppel).
100. 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1st Cir. 1993). The court did not address the details of the
bankruptcy proceeding, such as whether creditors were paid in full or even whether a final plan
was approved, but the bankruptcy case had been filed in 1988 and so had presumably concluded
by the time of the appeal in 1993. Id.
101. Id. at 570-71. The court also noted that the complaint was "quite properly" criticized
below for failing to conform to the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) "short and plain statement" criterion. Id.
at 570. The court further suggested that "even more justly" the complaint could have warranted
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions for failing to be "well grounded in fact." Id. at 570 n.1. It seems clear
from the court's comments in this regard that it did not hold Payless's case in high regard even
apart from the issue of judicial estoppel.
102. Id. at 571.
103. Id. (quoting Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3d
Cir. 1988)).
104. Id. (citing Oneida, 848 F.2d at 417).
20061 227
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
proceedings." 10 5 Finally, admonishing the district court's finding that
Payless's omission did not constitute a position that was "intentionally
inconsistent with its claims in this case," the appeals court again
emphasized the "long accepted nature of Payless's obligations in the
Chapter 11 proceeding." 10 6 The court seemed quite willing to read in
motive, and saw Payless as attempting to "get rid of [its] creditors on
the cheap.
'10 7
The First Circuit further elaborated on the level of intent
required in Jeffrey v. Desmond.'08 In this case, plaintiffs filed for
personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code but
failed to schedule as an asset a pending state court action against
Brooks Drug, Inc. ("Brooks").10 9 The bankruptcy court issued a no
asset discharge and closed the case. 110 On the eve of trial, Brooks
discovered that the Jeffreys had failed to schedule their claim as an
asset.' 1 ' Brooks moved for dismissal on the grounds of judicial
estoppel and the state court stayed the action. Subsequently, the
bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion to reopen the Jeffreys'
Chapter 7 case so that trustee Desmond could administer the
undisclosed state action. Upon reopening the bankruptcy case,
Desmond settled the state action for $10,000. The Jeffreys, believing
that the trustee had obtained an inadequate sum for the claim,
appealed the bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement to the
district court, which affirmed, and then to the First Circuit."1
2
In evaluating the lower court's approval of the claim
compromise, the First Circuit found no abuse of discretion, but went
on to specifically respond to the Jeffreys' arguments as to the
impropriety of the compromise.1 13 Most importantly, the Jeffreys
argued that their claim was valuable because it would not have been
judicially estopped under Payless, as their omission was
inadvertent.1 4 To support this argument, the Jeffreys alleged that
they orally disclosed the claim to trustee Desmond prior to receiving
the bankruptcy discharge but that Desmond determined the claim had
105. Id.
106. Id. at 572.
107. Id. at 571.
108. 70 F.3d 183, 187 (1st Cir. 1995).
109. Id. at 184.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 185.
113. Id. at 185-86.
114. Id. at 186.
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no value. 115  The court responded that "whether or not appellants'
initial failure to schedule the state court asset was intentional" the
"glaring" fact is that the omission would never have come to light
unless Brooks had discovered it.116 The court again characterized the
scheduling "silence" as "deafening."
'"17
Although the First Circuit court stated that inadvertence
might still invoke Payless, the court certainly appeared to imply some
minimal finding of motive in this instance. The court went on to state,
however, that even if judicial estoppel under Payless did not apply,
there was a sufficiently "serious question" regarding the substantive
viability of the Jeffereys' unscheduled claim as to justify approving the
compromise of it.118
2. Other Circuits: Expressly Requiring Intent
Other circuits have almost uniformly expressed a requirement
of malicious intent to apply judicial estoppel in a bankruptcy
nondisclosure setting, though their definitions of intent vary. The
Third Circuit dealt with the issue of undisclosed post-bankruptcy
claims in Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank." 9 Oneida
provided the basis for the First Circuit's later ruling in Payless, and
introduced the "deafening silence" language and concept later adopted
by Payless.120 Like Payless, Oneida involved a Chapter 11 debtor
failing to schedule a claim against a creditor in bankruptcy, then
pursuing the claim following confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan. 21
In Oneida, however, the court rested its decision on the joint
rationales of equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel, focusing on the
latter only secondarily.' 22
Eight years later, the Third Circuit refined its view on the
significance of intent in Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest
Lumber Co.123  In that case, plaintiff home builder Ryan had
purchased building materials from defendants Santiam-Midwest
115. Id.
116. Id. at 187.
117. Id. The court also took note that throughout the bankruptcy and the state action the
Jeffreys were represented by the same counsel. Id. at 186 n.4.
118. Id. at 187.
119. 848 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1988).
120. See Payless Wholesale Distribs, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1st
Cir. 1993) (discussed supra Part IV.A.1).
121. Oneida, 848 F.2d at 415-16.
122. Id. at 419.
123. 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Lumber Co. ("Santiam"). 124 After installing the material in numerous
homes, reports from homeowners revealed that the building materials
were defective. 125 As a result, Ryan was forced to institute a costly
replacement program for affected customers. 126 Ryan subsequently
filed voluntarily for Chapter 11 bankruptcy but did not specifically list
as assets its potential claims against the manufacturers of the
defective products nor did it list as liabilities any potential claims
against it by customers. 127 Defendant Santiam was not a party to the
bankruptcy proceedings, but during those proceedings the bankruptcy
court authorized Ryan to pursue or defend claims arising as a result of
the manufacturing defect. Ryan thus filed suit against defendant
Santiam in district court. 28 With that suit pending, the bankruptcy
court approved Ryan's reorganization plan and Ryan emerged from
bankruptcy. 129 Subsequently, Santiam and other defendants to Ryan's
district court action moved for summary judgment on estoppel
grounds because Ryan had failed to schedule the claim as an asset in
bankruptcy.130 The district court granted summary judgment to
defendants on judicial estoppel grounds. 13'
On appeal, the Third Circuit analyzed Ryan's intent as part of
its two-pronged analysis of whether Ryan's failure to disclose actually
created inconsistent positions. 32 First, the court analyzed whether
the positions taken were, in fact, inconsistent; and second, the court
inquired whether either or both of the inconsistent positions were
taken "in bad faith-i.e. with intent to play fast and loose with the
court."'133 The court ruled that the second prong, the bad faith inquiry,
settled the matter in this case, concluding that since Ryan adopted
neither position in bad faith, application of judicial estoppel was
unwarranted. 134 The court ruled that "[a]n inconsistent argument
124. Id. at 357.
125. Id.
126. Id.





132. Id. at 361. Ryan first argued that because he derived no benefit from failing to disclose
the claim in bankruptcy, application of judicial estoppel was inappropriate. Id. The court rejected
the argument, stating that, though a party receiving a benefit makes application of judicial
estoppel "particularly appropriate," receiving a benefit is not a "precondition" to application of
the doctrine. Id. The court noted, however, that a benefit is significant to the extent that it
demonstrates an "intent to play fast and loose with the courts." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 363.
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sufficient to invoke judicial estoppel must be attributable to
intentional wrongdoing.
'" 135
The court in Ryan Operations also explained its earlier decision
in Oneida as not adopting a per se inference of bad faith based on
nondisclosure, but, instead, as deriving a bad faith inference from the
specific record in that case. 136 By contrast, the court distinguished
Ryan's failure to disclose by pointing to several factual indications
that Ryan actually had nothing to gain by omitting to schedule the
claims. 137 The court explicitly held that a per se rule inferring intent
to deceive based solely on nondisclosure would "unduly expand judicial
estoppel" and instead found that inadvertent nondisclosures should be
treated differently than deliberate nondisclosures.
Recently, the Third Circuit further explained its intent inquiry
in Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp.138 In that case, plaintiff Krystal operated a GM automobile
franchise which had experienced financial difficulty. 139  Due to
Krystal's financial trouble, defendant GM notified Krystal that it
intended to terminate the franchise agreement. 140 The day before
termination was to become effective, however, Krystal filed an action
challenging the franchise termination as improper (Krystal 1).141 After
negative initial results in that litigation, Krystal filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy while continuing to press its claims regarding the
135. Id. at 362.
136. Id.
137. Id. First, the court pointed out that although Ryan failed to schedule the claim as an
asset, he also proportionately failed to disclose associated liabilities stemming from defective
installations so there was no net misrepresentation. Id. Presumably, the court did not intend to
formulate a general rule that concealed claims can be offset by concealed liabilities, but rather
attempted to show no motive existed to conceal the claim, and at least one commentator has
found this aspect of the court's reasoning troublesome. See Louis M. Phillips, Judicial Estoppel:
Is it Krystal Clear Now?, 12 NoRTON BANKR L. ADVISER 1 (2003) (criticizing the court as
implying that "it is acceptable to fail to disclose assets just as long as there is a counterbalancing
failure to disclose debts").
As a second factor, the court pointed to the reorganization plan that specified creditors would
receive 91% of proceeds and suffer 91% of losses associated with the defective installation
litigation of which the unscheduled claim at issue was a part. Ryan, 81 F.3d at 363. Finally, the
court noted that Ryan's actions subsequent to filing his incomplete asset schedule did not
support a finding of intent because Ryan requested and received permission from the bankruptcy
court to pursue the omitted claim, and even submitted records of his attorneys' fees that detailed
work on the claim at issue. Id. at 364. As a result, the court found that Ryan had not deliberately
concealed the claim to obtain an unfair advantage, and ruled that judicial estoppel was
inapplicable under such a scenario. Id. at 364-65.
138. 337 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2003).





franchise termination. 142 Part of Krystal's proposed bankruptcy
reorganization plan called for selling the disputed franchise to pay off
creditors but including in the sales contract a disclaimer that the
status of the franchise was "now in litigation." 143 GM opposed this
plan.144 After losing in bankruptcy court and district court, Krystal
prevailed on its franchise claim in the Third Circuit on the grounds
that GM's revocation violated the automatic stay provision of the
bankruptcy code. 1
45
After prevailing, Krystal attempted to build on its success by
filing claims for violation of the automatic stay, conspiracy, tortious
interference with contractual relations, and other violations arising
out of GM's attempted franchise revocation (Krystal 11).146 The lower
court dismissed Krystal's claims on the basis of judicial estoppel
because Krystal had failed to previously schedule these new claims as
assets in bankruptcy.147 Krystal appealed to the Third Circuit. 148
To determine whether judicial estoppel should apply against
Krystal's claims, the Third Circuit first reviewed the requirements for
imposing the doctrine. The court cited three elements: first, the party
must have taken two irreconcilably inconsistent positions; second, the
party must have changed its position in bad faith (i.e. with intent to
play fast and loose with the courts); and third, judicial estoppel cannot
apply unless it is "tailored to address the harm identified" and "no
lesser sanction would adequately remedy the damage done by the
litigant's misconduct."149 After outlining the criteria, the court found
that all were met in this case and judicial estoppel was warranted.1 50
In finding that Krystal possessed the requisite intent, the court
applied a two-pronged test inquiring whether Krystal had "both
knowledge of a claim and a motive to conceal that claim in the face of
an affirmative duty to disclose."'151 The court found financial motive
and, while acknowledging that Krystal's instant claims may not have
been obviously viable at all times prior to Krystal I, the court
nonetheless reiterated the importance of disclosure and excused
nondisclosure only of "hypothetical claims that are so tenuous as to be
142. Id. at 317-18.




147. Id. at 319.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 320-25.
151. Id. at 321.
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fanciful." 152 As to whether estoppel would be tailored narrowly to
address the harm, the court found that no lesser sanction would
punish Krystal sufficiently to serve the goal of promoting disclosure.
1 53
The court stated that a lesser sanction, such as requiring Krystal to
pay unsecured creditors the balance of their claims out of any
damages recovered, would "reward Krystal for what appears to be
duplicitous conduct."
154
The Fifth Circuit applied a similar two-pronged knowledge and
motive intent examination in In re Coastal Plains, a case that aptly
illustrates the potential complications arising from corporate
bankruptcy nondisclosures. 15 5 In Coastal Plains, debtor Coastal did
not disclose an outside lawsuit that it had filed against Browning, its
largest unsecured creditor, one week after Coastal filed for
bankruptcy. 156 While the outside suit lay dormant, Coastal's former
management created a new entity called Industrial Clearinghouse
("IC") and indirectly repurchased all of Coastal's former assets
pursuant to a lift-stay. 157  In this transaction, the previously
undisclosed claim suspiciously reappeared as a listed asset. 5
8
Subsequently, Coastal's bankruptcy was converted from Chapter 11 to
Chapter 7, and the bankruptcy court permitted IC and the estate to go
forward with the outside action. 159 Ultimately, the suit yielded a
multimillion dollar verdict against Browning.1 60 Browning appealed
to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that judicial estoppel based on
nondisclosure barred the action.' 6' The Fifth Circuit agreed and
rendered judgment for Browning, holding that Coastal's knowledge of
the action and pecuniary motive to conceal it precluded any
inadvertence defense to judicial estoppel.' 62 The Fifth Circuit later
152. Id. at 322-23. Commentators have persuasively argued that such a requirement
imposes too strict and inclusive a disclosure burden on debtors to be workable. See Phillips,
supra note 137 (arguing that the Third Circuit set too broad a disclosure requirement in this
case).
153. Krystal, 337 F.3d at 325.
154. Id.
155. 179 F.3d 197, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1999).
156. Id. at 202-03.
157. Id. at 203.
158. Id. Coastal again omitted to disclose the action in the lift-stay petition, but IC
specifically included the claim in the consignment agreement through which it acquired Coastal's
former assets. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 204.
161. Id. at 204-05.
162. Id. at 213.
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affirmed this intent-focused nondisclosure analysis pattern in In re
Superior Crewboats, discussed in the introduction to this Note. 
163
The Sixth Circuit has adopted reasoning similar to the pattern
reflected in the Third and Fifth Circuit cases reviewed here. 164 These
courts' applications of judicial estoppel against debtors seeking to
assert claims unscheduled in prior bankruptcy proceedings generally
turn on a finding of intent. In nearly all cases, the courts first ruled
that by omitting the claim and then later asserting it, the primary
judicial estoppel elements were met: 1) a contrary position had been
asserted and 2) a tribunal had adopted that position. The courts then
generally turned to the particular circumstances of each case to
determine whether failing to disclose the claim was intentional or
inadvertent.
B. Standing: Examining Who Owns the Cause of Action and Whose
Intent Matters
Rather than focusing solely on the intent of the debtor and
viewing undisclosed post-bankruptcy actions as primarily a two-party
dispute, some courts have more closely examined technical issues
associated with standing and ownership of the cause of action. Courts
thus analyze not simply whether to estop the debtor from bringing
suit, but also whether the bankruptcy estate has effectively
abandoned the claim.
163. 374 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2004).
164. Initially, in Reynolds v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit appeared to adopt a rather
strict interpretation of judicial estoppel. See 861 F.2d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that
judicial estoppel should prevent the Internal Revenue Service from arguing that a husband was
liable for taxes on a capital gain after convincing another court in an earlier bankruptcy
proceeding that the wife was liable for the tax); see also Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 775 (6th
Cir. 2002) (explaining that certain dicta in Reynolds could support the proposition that an
"omission by a debtor can support a finding of judicial estoppel'). Later, however, the court
adopted an intent inquiry similar to that adopted by the Third and Fifth Circuits. In Browning,
the court inquired whether the debtor omitting a claim had knowledge of the claim as well as a
motive to conceal it in order to determine whether judicial estoppel should apply. 283 F.3d at
775-76. Later, the Sixth Circuit declined to apply judicial estoppel to bar an unscheduled claim
where no motive to conceal was found. Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Group, Inc. 385 F.3d 894, 898-99
(6th Cir. 2004). The majority held that although the debtor possessed knowledge of the
unscheduled claim he undertook "constant affirmative actions ... to appraise the court of the
pending claim" that disproved the requisite motive to conceal. Id. at 899 n.2. Most recently, the
Sixth Circuit again upheld this stance. Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 141 Fed.Appx. 420, 421 (6th
Cir. 2005) (applying judicial estoppel to bar a cause of action undisclosed by a Chapter 13
debtor).
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1. Chapter 7 Standing: The Eleventh Circuit's About-Face
The evolution of the Eleventh Circuit's position on the standing
of Chapter 7 debtors to bring undisclosed bankruptcy claims serves to
represent the spectrum of views courts have taken in evaluating the
issue. Initially, the Eleventh Circuit took the position that a
nondisclosing Chapter 7 debtor does, in fact, have standing to bring a
previously undisclosed claim, but that judicial estoppel may apply to
bar the claim. Subsequent cases, however, repudiate that reasoning
and instead recognize the bankruptcy trustee as the exclusive party
with standing to pursue the claim. Further, the court most recently
held that judicial estoppel is inapplicable to the trustee in such a
context, and thus the trustee may pursue the claim on behalf of the
estate.
Initially, in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., the Eleventh
Circuit adopted the view that a Chapter 7 debtor has standing to bring
a cause of action undisclosed in bankruptcy and that judicial estoppel
applies to bar the claim where a motive to conceal is found. 165 In
Burnes, debtor Billups filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection at
which time he was not engaged in any outside causes of action.166 Six
months later, Billups, together with 35 other plaintiffs filed a
multimillion dollar discrimination lawsuit against his employer
Pemco, but never amended his Chapter 13 asset schedule to include
the new lawsuit. 167 Subsequently, Billups converted his Chapter 13
petition to a Chapter 7 case and filed updated schedules but again
omitted to disclose his ongoing cause of action. 168 After the
bankruptcy court had granted a no-asset discharge, Pemco discovered
the omission and moved for summary judgment on judicial estoppel
grounds. 169 The district court granted summary judgment and Billups
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 170
Rather than addressing standing, the Eleventh Circuit
implicitly assumed proper standing and analyzed Burnes under a
bankruptcy nondisclosure judicial estoppel framework similar to that
established by the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. The court
principally examined whether Billups possessed the requisite intent
under the two-part knowledge and motive inquiry.1 71 The court
165. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002).





171. Id. at 1286-87.
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concluded that Billups clearly possessed knowledge of the claim as
evidenced by his filing of it during the bankruptcy proceedings.
172
Further, the court ruled as to motive that "it is unlikely [Billups]
would have received the benefit of a conversion to Chapter 7 followed
by a no asset, complete discharge" if creditors had known of the
multimillion dollar lawsuit. 173 Significantly, the court went on to
address Billups's argument that he should be permitted to reopen his
bankruptcy case and amend the asset schedule to include his
undisclosed claim. 174 The court held that this "so-called remedy"
would suggest "that a debtor should consider disclosing potential
assets only if he is caught concealing them."'175 The court thus
appeared primarily concerned with protecting the judicial process and
enforcing the bankruptcy disclosure requirement.
In the next Eleventh Circuit case, Barger v. City of Cartersville,
the court shifted its analysis and ruled that, in fact, the Chapter 7
trustee, not the debtor, is the exclusive party in interest to a cause of
action undisclosed in bankruptcy. 176 The court further held, however,
that the trustee steps into the shoes of the debtor and thus remains
subject to judicial estoppel. 177  Barger presented facts similar to
Burnes except that in Barger, debtor Barger filed her employment
discrimination cause of action before filing for bankruptcy, and she
filed under Chapter 7 from the outset.178 Barger first omitted the
discrimination claim in her asset schedule and then later incorrectly
disclosed that her cause of action sought reinstatement of employment
only, neglecting to mention the compensatory and punitive damages
that she also sought. 179 She subsequently received a discharge of over
$58,000 in debt, with no assets being distributed to the trustee.180
Upon learning of the discharge, defendant Cartersville moved to
dismiss on judicial estoppel grounds, a move Barger tried to "thwart"
by reopening her bankruptcy petition.18' The district court granted
Cartersville's motion to dismiss and refused to reconsider despite the
reopening; Barger appealed.'
8 2
172. Id. at 1287-88.
173. Id. at 1289.
174. Id. at 1288.
175. Id.
176.348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003).
177. Id. at 1297.




182. Id. at 1292.
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The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the issue of Barger's
standing to bring her claim.'8 3 The court found that Barger met the
constitutional standing requirements and then turned to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 17(a) to determine whether Barger or the trustee
administering Barger's bankruptcy was the real party in interest.
8 4
The court held that because Barger filed her discrimination claim
after her bankruptcy petition, by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), her
claims became property of the bankruptcy estate at the time of filing,
and the trustee was the real party in interest.18 5 The court further
determined, however, that the transfer of interest invoked Federal
Rule 25(c), and since the district court never substituted or joined the
trustee, Rule 25(c) operates so that "the [t]rustee simply takes
Barger's place from hereon."'18 6 The court then proceeded to its
judicial estoppel analysis following the precedent of Burnes.
Ultimately, the court determined that the debtor's position was
contrary to the position adopted by a court previously and that it was
taken in bad faith. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the monetary damages portion of the discrimination claim
on judicial estoppel grounds.
Following Burnes and Barger, the Eleventh Circuit again
shifted its approach in Parker v. Wendy's International, Inc. by
reaffirming that the trustee has exclusive standing to bring
undisclosed causes of action but further holding that judicial estoppel
is thus inapplicable because the debtor's failure to disclose is not
attributable to the trustee. 8 7 Parker presented facts analogous to
Barger: plaintiff Parker filed an employment discrimination case, later
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy but in her bankruptcy schedule failed
to disclose the pending discrimination claim as an asset. 88 The
defendant employer sought to judicially estop Parker due to the
omission.' 8 9  Upon learning of the undisclosed claim, however,
bankruptcy trustee Reynolds successfully sought to reopen the
bankruptcy proceeding and intervene in the discrimination case. 190
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.; see also supra Part III (discussing the interaction of the bankruptcy statutes with
regard to ownership of undisclosed claims).
186. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1292-93.
187. 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
188. Id. at 1269-70.




Unlike its analysis in Burnes, the court in Parker analyzed the
issue of standing in conjunction with the judicial estoppel issue. 191
This time, citing to Barger, the court concluded that "[glenerally
speaking, a pre-petition cause of action is the property of the Chapter
7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee in bankruptcy has standing
to pursue it."192 Based on this, the court went on to concede that "it is
questionable as to whether judicial estoppel was correctly applied in
Burnes."'193 Instead, the court held that since only Parker and not
trustee Reynolds had made a contradictory assertion as to the
existence of the cause of action, judicial estoppel was inapplicable to
either party. 194 It was inapplicable to Reynolds because Reynolds had
made no prior representation regarding the claim and it was
inapplicable to Parker because Parker lacked standing.
95
2. Chapter 11 Standing
Chapter 11 standing builds on the statutory framework
presented for Chapter 7 cases, but differs in significant ways. First, as
more often than not the debtor itself acts as the trustee of the Chapter
11 estate, the Chapter 7 analysis differentiating between debtor and
trustee does not directly apply. 196 Adding to the complication, 11
U.S.C. § 1141(b) provides that, in the Chapter 11 context,
"confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the
debtor."'197 Courts have noted the "tension" between this provision and
the commonly accepted rule that undisclosed, unadministered assets
remain property of the estate at the close of bankruptcy
proceedings. 198 For clarification, courts have looked to neighboring §
1141(c), which provides that "after confirmation of a plan, the property
dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of
creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the
debtor."' 99 At least one court has interpreted this clause to divest a
191. Id at 1271.




196. Although this analysis does not specifically address the minority of Chapter 11 cases in
which a trustee is appointed, the same standing issues that arise for Chapter 7 trustees would
likely apply in such rare instances.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (2006).
198. See, e.g., Rosenshein v. Kleban, 918 F. Supp. 98, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that there
is some tension between section 1141(b) and some courts' holdings that property not formally
disclosed remains part of the estate).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2006).
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debtor of standing to pursue undisclosed claims by reasoning that only
property "dealt with" under the plan becomes "free and clear" of
claims, whereas other property (including unscheduled estate assets)
remains property of the estate.
200
Alternatively, several courts which have examined the issue of
standing in Chapter 11 nondisclosure cases have interpreted the
broad language of § 1141(b) to vest the debtor with ownership and
standing to pursue undisclosed causes of action but with a "hitch."
These courts have applied the language of § 1141(c) to require that
undisclosed causes of action are not, in fact, "free and clear of all
claims and interests of creditors" but rather, remain subject to such
claims.201 To ensure that the cause of action remains subject to
creditor and other third party claims, these courts have ordered a stay
of proceedings to enable the plaintiff to reopen the bankruptcy estate
and add the cause of action to the disclosure schedule.
3. Chapter 13 Standing
Courts have generally concluded that a Chapter 13 debtor
retains standing to prosecute disclosed causes of action belonging to
the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 1303. Although § 1303 does not explicitly
provide Chapter 13 debtors with the power to prosecute causes of
action, the Second Circuit in Olick v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co.
concluded that the power to do so was implied. 20 2 The court based its
reasoning on a review of the legislative history of § 1303 as well as the
nature of Chapter 13 bankruptcy in which "the creditors' recovery is
drawn from the debtor's earnings, not from the assets of the
bankruptcy estate."20 3 In the time since the Second Circuit's decision,
the Third and Seventh Circuits as well as numerous bankruptcy
courts have similarly concluded that the trustee powers permit a
200. Rosenshein, 918 F. Supp. at 102-03.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2006). See, e.g., Phoenix Petroleum Co. v. U.S., No. 98-5124, 1999
WL 521189, at *6 (Fed. Cir. July 23, 1999) (finding that section 1141(c) is better given effect by
letting the plaintiff proceed with the claim only if steps are taken to protect the creditors);
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 422 (3d Cir. 1988) (Stapleton,
J., dissenting) (asserting that creditors should be safeguarded, not prejudiced, in the case of
nondisclosure); Greenhart Durawoods, Inc. v. PHF Int'l. Corp., No. 91 Civ. 3731, 1994 WL
652434 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1994) (holding that a debtor's undisclosed litigation claims are subject
to creditors' claims); Winmark Ltd. P'ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 693 A.2d 824, 829-30 (Md.
1997) ("Property that has not been 'dealt with by the plan' remains with the debtor-in-
possession, but subject to the claims of creditors.").




Chapter 13 debtor to assert and prosecute causes of action owned by
the estate.
204
Where a Chapter 13 debtor seeks to prosecute an undisclosed
cause of action, courts have generally forgone any question of standing
and proceeded directly to the question of judicial estoppel. This may
be due in part to the fact that a Chapter 13 case, unlike a Chapter 7
discharge or Chapter 11 reorganization, remains open until the
completion of the confirmed plan. Consequently, a nondisclosing
Chapter 13 debtor need not petition the bankruptcy court to amend its
schedule but may instead directly file a schedule amendment with the
court. In addition, under 11 U.S.C. § 1327, confirmation of a Chapter
13 plan vests all property of the estate in the debtor. 20 5 Two recent
cases in the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits apply judicial estoppel in the
Chapter 13 nondisclosure context without suggesting any standing or
party in interest concerns.
206
4. Curing a Standing Defect and the Cooperation of Bankruptcy
Courts
In cases where plaintiffs anticipate the court carefully
examining the issue of debtor standing to bring causes of action
undisclosed in bankruptcy, litigants may attempt to head off this
argument themselves. Such plaintiffs attempting to prosecute causes
of action initially undisclosed in bankruptcy have begun to request the
reopening of their prior bankruptcy proceedings to join or substitute
the bankruptcy trustee.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350, the bankruptcy court may
exercise its discretion to reopen a case for the purpose of
administering assets or for other cause. 20 7 Depending largely on
whether the circuit in which a given bankruptcy court sits permits
trustee standing to bring claims otherwise subject to judicial estoppel,
the court may be more or less receptive to such a proposal. Some
bankruptcy courts, taking a cue from their respective circuit courts,
204. See Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1210 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992);
Cable v. Ivy Tech State Coll., 200 F.3d 467, 472-74 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Donato v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 230 B.R. 418, 425 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that Olick and Maritime were persuasive
and therefore the debtor had standing to litigate the causes of action); In re Wirmel, 134 B.R.
258, 260 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (explaining that a debtor has a concurrent power with the
bankruptcy trustee to sue and be sued).
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2006).
206. See Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 04-5675, 2005 WL 1579713, at *4 (6th Cir. July 06,
2005) (applying a judicial estoppel remedy to a Chapter 13 plaintiff that failed to disclose its
cause of action in bankruptcy); De Leon v. Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003)
(same).
207. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2006).
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may refuse to reopen a case for the purpose of administering an
undisclosed cause of action. 208 Other bankruptcy courts, however,
have proven more receptive to reopening such cases.
20 9
V. ANALYZING THE COMPETING MOTIVATIONS
Bankruptcy nondisclosure cases highlight the conflict between
the motivations driving the development of bankruptcy law and those
behind the imposition of judicial estoppel. Analyzing the historical
versions of judicial estoppel 210 demonstrates that otherwise strong
policy motivations behind judicial estoppel become attenuated in a
bankruptcy setting. The original, strict version of judicial estoppel
developed in Hamilton generally applies to protect the sanctity of a
judicial oath. 211 Early First Circuit opinions such as Payless that do
not explicitly require motivation or excuse inadvertence are most akin
to such an application. 21 2 The purpose of such a rule is served,
however, only to the extent that application of judicial estoppel
punishes the original person averring a statement. When judicial
estoppel serves to punish outside parties such as the bankruptcy
trustee or individual creditors by preventing recovery, those parties
inequitably suffer the consequences of the debtor's action.
The modern version of judicial estoppel articulated by the
Supreme Court in New Hampshire applies more generally to protect
the integrity of the courts. 213 Courts applying this doctrine to the
bankruptcy nondisclosure setting often indicate that judicial estoppel
protects the bankruptcy system by emphasizing and enforcing the
disclosure requirements. The majority analysis applied in the Third,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, however, essentially applies judicial estoppel
to trump other potential concerns and externalities arising in the
litigation, particularly with regard to bankruptcy creditors. As
applied in a non-bankruptcy setting such as New Hampshire, judicial
estoppel generally affects only the rights of the immediate parties. In
a bankruptcy setting, however, an adjudication of the debtor's rights
inevitably affects interests of unpaid creditors. Furthermore, applying
judicial estoppel in a bankruptcy nondisclosure scenario actually
208. In re Walker, 323 B.R. 188, 198-99 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
209. See, e.g., In re Lewis 273 B.R. 739 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001).
210. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the historical development of American judicial
estoppel law).
211. See id. (discussing the strict version of judicial estoppel adopted in Hamilton).
212. See supra Part IV.A. 1 (discussing the analysis in Payless).




undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy court in a significant way:
it leaves in place the original fraud committed by the failure to
disclose assets. Courts applying judicial estoppel in a bankruptcy
nondisclosure context bend the doctrine to impose a punitive sanction
on the immediate interested parties-both the culpable debtor as well
as innocent creditors-and to deter potential future nondisclosure.
For each element of the judicial estoppel analysis the Third,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits invoke, countervailing concerns arise. The
first element queries whether a debtor is asserting a claim
contradictory to one it has asserted in a prior proceeding. Under the
majority view, a debtor who fails to disclose a claim in bankruptcy and
later asserts the claim in a subsequent proceeding has adopted a
contradictory position sufficient to satisfy this element.214  This
analysis ignores, however, the principle of statutory law emphasized
in Parker that all Chapter 7 debtor assets transfer to the estate upon
filing the bankruptcy petition.215 Furthermore, the standing analysis
in Parker highlights a troubling aspect of applying judicial estoppel to
bankruptcy cases: it often fails to account for the rights of creditors. 2
16
It is the debtor who took the position that no suit existed by failing to
schedule a claim. To the extent that the undisclosed claim remains in
the possession of the estate, the debtor's previous position should be
irrelevant for purposes of judicial estoppel.
The second element of the majority approach to judicial
estoppel inquires whether judicial adoption of or reliance on the
position has occurred. As the Supreme Court stated in New
Hampshire, this element primarily serves to prevent the risk of
inconsistent court determinations and thus protects justice, as well as
the integrity of the courts.217 When one court has already adopted a
litigant's position and the litigant subsequently asserts the opposite,
by adopting a contradictory position the later court risks creating "the
perception that either the first or the second court was misled."21 8 In
non-bankruptcy scenarios, prior courts cannot easily go back and fix
what has occurred, and furthermore it may not always be clear which
position was in fact true or correct. In the bankruptcy nondisclosure
setting, however, these concerns abate significantly due to the ability
214. See, e.g., Superior Crewboats, Inc., v. Primary P & I Underwriters, (In re Superior
Crewboats, Inc.), 374 F.3d 330, 336 (discussed supra Part I); Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC
Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussed supra Part IV.A.2).
215. See supra Part IV.B.1 (examining the development of Eleventh Circuit precedent on
judicial estoppel in bankruptcy proceedings).
216. Id.
217. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001).
218. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982)).
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of the bankruptcy court to reopen and admit the new cause of action to
the estate at any time. Thus, in the bankruptcy setting, rather than
essentially leaving the nondisclosure fraud in place by applying
judicial estoppel to the outside cause of action, instead forcing a debtor
to go back to the bankruptcy court to correct the fraud actually better
safeguards the court's integrity. Finally, in applying judicial estoppel
to guard the integrity of the courts, courts may inadvertently diminish
judicial integrity by letting culpable defendants in the outside cause of
action off the hook by dismissing otherwise meritorious claims.
The final element in the majority judicial estoppel analysis is
whether the debtor intentionally omitted the claim or whether the
omission was inadvertent (i.e., in good faith). This inquiry ensures
that the court does not apply an equitable doctrine to produce inequity
and also provides a disincentive for debtors to scheme and connive. In
this sense, the inquiry addresses the motivation behind the "fast and
loose" version of judicial estoppel that seeks to discourage litigants
from manipulating the system. Yet, the very two-part test most
commonly applied to determine whether a debtor possesses the
requisite intent actually illustrates the inequity that can arise by
imposing judicial estoppel. When a debtor possesses both knowledge
of a claim and motivation to conceal it, courts will often impose
judicial estoppel.219  The first knowledge element is arguably
superfluous: if the debtor lacked knowledge, or at least some minimal
constructive knowledge that a claim existed, he could not be required
to report it under 11 U.S.C. § 521 and consequently no contradictory
position would exist. Courts typically determine the second element,
motive to conceal the claim, by seeking evidence that the debtor could
have stood to gain from concealing the claim. This, in turn, often
reduces to whether unpaid creditors would otherwise have benefited
had the debtor scheduled the claim. This very point, however, serves
to illustrate the fact that dismissing the claim would likely inequitably
disadvantage innocent creditors who might otherwise share proceeds
of the newly revealed claim.
The general motivations behind bankruptcy law further serve
to guide the application of judicial estoppel in nondisclosure cases.
The basic goals of bankruptcy law concern optimizing business choices
ex-ante, ex-post maximization of the value of the estate, and an
overarching goal of economic efficiency. As nondisclosure scenarios
arise only once bankruptcy has occurred, ex-ante optimization is
largely inapplicable. Ex-post maximization of estate value, however,
219. See, e.g., In re Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 332 (discussed supra Part I); Krystal,
337 F.3d at 317-18 (discussed supra Part IV.A.2).
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is intimately related to the imposition of judicial estoppel in a
bankruptcy scenario. Full disclosure of all assets is necessary to
assure that the estate represents its maximum possible value. Many
courts applying the majority analysis implicitly or explicitly indicate
that upholding such bankruptcy disclosure requirements takes
precedence over potential externalities and justifies imposition of
judicial estoppel. 220 In achieving its goals, however, bankruptcy law
also seeks to maintain efficiency and minimize such externalities and
transaction costs.
22'
In the case of a corporate bankruptcy in particular, where the
stakes are high and either unsecured creditors or equity holders are
almost certain to remain unpaid, the goal of maximizing estate value
militates against a strict application of judicial estoppel. Further,
where corporate debt and management structure may likely shift
significantly and a debtor corporation's causes of action may be bought
and sold, a searching analysis of which entity may assert standing for
the cause of action and which entity may be estopped based on prior
acts becomes all the more significant. Rarely is the mechanism of
judicial estoppel best suited to preserve the integrity of the court while
achieving these ends.
Choosing to myopically focus only on the systemic protections
sought by judicial estoppel or only on the economic maximization
sought by bankruptcy law fails to adequately account for all interests
at stake. An ideal solution balances the competing legal motivations
as well as the interests of the parties and outside creditors. Such a
solution seeks to maximize the value of the estate efficiently while
maintaining the protection of the sanctity of the oath and the integrity
of the courts.
VI. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
As the foregoing analysis indicates, a judicial estoppel-centered
focus on the debtor's motive or culpability for nondisclosure is often
misplaced and may lead to inefficient outcomes in many cases.
Although concern for debtor culpability and preservation of the
disclosure system may be well-grounded, the proposed framework
220. See, e.g., Krystal, 337 F.3d at 325 (rejecting the application of a lesser sanction that
would permit creditors to recover discharged debt under the rationale that such a remedy may
permit the culpable nondiscloser to profit and "the integrity of both the bankruptcy process and
the judicial process would suffer").
221. See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 48 (discussing the economic goals of bankruptcy
law); see also An-Tze Cheng v. K & S Diversified Invs. (In re An-Tze Cheng), 308 B.R. 448, 460
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (arguing that "[tihe equitable balance compels consideration of whether
the economic consequences of a judicial estoppel are borne by third parties").
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suggests that in many cases, the analysis can be refined so as to
minimize external effects on third parties while still promoting the
goals advanced by judicial estoppel. Without ignoring debtor
culpability, the proposed framework rejects debtor intent as the
touchstone of judicial estoppel application in bankruptcy
nondisclosure cases and instead heeds the direction of the Eleventh
Circuit, focusing on preserving creditor rights and punishing only
culpable nondisclosing parties. 222 This framework primarily seeks to
promote the rights of creditors and other interested third parties while
also holding nondisclosing debtors accountable.
Ideally, bankrupt debtors would consistently and honestly
disclose all assets and thereby eliminate the need to consider
nondisclosure remedies. The debtor clearly stands in the best position
to know or gain knowledge of potential causes of action that may.
benefit the bankruptcy estate. Consequently, a sound framework of
analysis should create incentives to disclose or disincentives to
withhold scheduling causes of action. Perhaps most significantly,
however, as the framework punishes culpable withholding debtors, it
should also serve the interests of third parties as equitably and
efficiently as possible. Finally, in order to promote fair outcomes, the
framework should differentiate between culpable debtors seeking a
windfall from intentionally omitting claims and innocent debtors
inadvertently omitting claims. Due to the distinct sets of concerns
arising under various bankruptcy scenarios, the framework offered is
divided to illustrate outcomes under Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and
Chapter 13 scenarios.
A. Chapter 7 Nondisclosures
To best serve the interest of creditors as well as debtors and
defendants, the parties under Chapter 7 must be considered in their
distinct legal capacities rather than lumping the debtor in with the
trustee and the creditors. To this extent, and because without a party
in proper standing no remedy can be applied, courts should first fully
examine issues of standing in a bankruptcy nondisclosure case.223
Nearly all courts recognize that the consequence of 11 U.S.C. § 521 is
that undisclosed claims become property of the trustee upon filing of
the bankruptcy petition. From that point on, unless otherwise agreed,
the trustee retains sole standing and authority to pursue or abandon
222. See Parker v. Wendy's Int'l., Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1271-73 (11th Cir. 2004).
223. But see In re Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 334-35 (announcing that the remedy of
judicial estoppel eliminated the need to examine standing).
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claims that entered the estate. Upon closing the bankruptcy action,
only assets of the estate scheduled under § 521 "not otherwise
administered" are effectively abandoned by the estate. Even explicit
abandonment of undisclosed causes of action based on a debtor's false
representations should be viewed critically when a trustee later seeks
to pursue the action, as to do otherwise would tend to unfairly
prejudice the rights of creditors. 224  From this general statutory
scheme, specific corporate and individual Chapter 7 issues are further
explored.
1. The Individual Scenario
In the individual bankruptcy scenario, the Eleventh Circuit's
approach in Parker exemplifies the benefits of distinguishing the
debtor from the trustee for purposes of standing and judicial
estoppel.225 As a preliminary matter, for procedural purposes but not
in relation to substantive outcomes, it becomes significant whether the
debtor files the omitted claim before or after filing bankruptcy. 226 If
the party files its outside action before filing bankruptcy, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 17(a) is satisfied because the proper party in
interest was named in filing the suit.227  In such a claim-first,
bankruptcy-second scenario, however, Federal Rule 25(c) governing
transfer of interest will apply to require substitution of the trustee. 228
If the omitted cause of action is filed post-bankruptcy, Rule 17(a)
224. This scenario arose in Superior Crewboats when the debtor induced the bankruptcy
trustee to abandon an otherwise undisclosed and unscheduled cause of action through false oral
representations that rendered the cause valueless and barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at
333-35. Although abandonment is typically irrevocable, circumstances such as fraud combined
with insufficient notice and lack of knowledge may justify finding abandonment ineffective. See
Killebrew v. Brewer (In re Killebrew), 888 F.2d 1516, 1520 n.10 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing
limited exceptions to allowing revocation based on concealed property or the trustee's lack of
knowledge or means of knowledge). To bind creditors based on a trustee's fraudulently induced
abandonment overlooks the inherent externalities of bankruptcy proceedings.
225. The framework presented here for individual Chapter 7 nondisclosures builds upon the
criticism presented in other discussions of Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292
(1ith Cir. 2003). Phillips & Brown, supra note 7 (proposing a method of analyzing standing in
personal bankruptcy nondisclosure cases); see also Parker, 365 F.3d 1271-73 (analyzing standing
in conjunction with judicial estoppel in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy nondisclosure scenario). In
addition, it is worth again noting that recent changes in the Bankruptcy Code force more
individual debtors from Chapter 7 into Chapter 13; however, this does not affect the substance of
the analysis.
226. See Phillips & Brown, supra note 7 (explaining the interaction between Fed. R. Civ. P.
17(a) and 25(c) and criticizing the court's analysis in Barger).
227. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
228. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c).
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becomes an issue because the proper party has not been named in the
suit if the trustee is not included.
229
In either case, the proper action for the courts is to facilitate
substitution or joinder of the trustee, including reopening the
bankruptcy claim if necessary. As noted previously, it is within the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to reopen a case under 11 U.S.C. § 350.
Based on the foregoing analysis, bankruptcy courts should favor
reopening, except in cases of frivolous causes of action. The reason for
the preference for reopening is clear: when the bankruptcy court
refuses to reopen the case, the undisclosed claim must be dismissed
due to lack of standing or failure to join a necessary party. This result
would merely propagate the inefficiencies and injustice sought to be
corrected.
Once the trustee becomes available, two scenarios may arise.
First, the trustee may determine that it is not in the interest of the
estate to pursue the claim and may agree to abandon it under 11
U.S.C. § 554. At that point, the interests of the outside creditors will
have been protected and the abandoned claim will revert back to the
debtor. If the debtor continues to pursue the cause of action, the court
should only then proceed to analyze whether it should judicially estop
the action under the majority bad faith inquiry. If the court finds that
judicial estoppel does not bar the debtor from proceeding, it can then
reach the merits of the underlying claim. In considering judicial
estoppel, however, the court should also bear in mind other remedies
such as the traditional bankruptcy law sanctions for failing to disclose
assets or a finding of fraud upon the court under Procedural Rule
60(b). 230
Alternatively, the trustee may determine that it is in the best
interest of the estate to proceed with the claim. In that event, the
court should permit joinder or substitution of the trustee pursuant to
Rules 17(a) or 25(c) without regard to the debtor's intent; the debtor's
bad acts or intent should not bar the trustee from recovering on assets
of the estate. Judicial estoppel analysis should come into play,
however, if the trustee seeks or gains an amount greater than what is
owed to the creditors in bankruptcy. 231 Rather than simply allowing a
229. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
230. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see An-Tze Cheng v. K & S Diversified Invs. (In re An-Tze Cheng),
308 B.R. 448, 462 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting alternative remedies apart from judicial
estoppel for parties manipulating the system in bankruptcy actions).
231. See Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that perhaps in future cases
judicial estoppel could bar recovery beyond the amount owed to creditors); see also Phillips &
Brown, supra note 7 (referring to such amounts beyond the estate's maximum recovery as a
debtor's "reversionary" interest in the claim).
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culpable debtor to profit from nondisclosure, the court should apply
the standard intent-focused majority judicial estoppel inquiry to
determine whether he may be allowed to exercise a reversionary
interest in such a recovery beyond the debt owed.232
Although this framework promotes more equitable and
economically efficient outcomes, critics might charge that the process
of administering undisclosed causes of action is inherently wasteful.
Especially in the individual or consumer case, most such causes of
action, even if disclosed in bankruptcy, may be assessed as sufficiently
speculative or costly as to be valued at zero and abandoned by the
estate. 233 Two significant points arise in response. First, existing
cases demonstrate that there are numerous instances in which a
Chapter 7 trustee values an initially undisclosed cause of action so
much that the trustee independently petitions the court for joinder or
substitution in the subsequent action. Second, regardless of efficiency
concerns, the court cannot impose any remedy including judicial
estoppel where there is no plaintiff with standing to bring the action.
As a result, under the proposed framework, the bankruptcy judge
performs a gatekeeping function by determining whether to reopen
the case to administer the cause of action or whether to revoke
discharge entirely or dismiss the petition in cases of clear abuse.
Rather than applying the heavy-handed remedy of judicial estoppel to
the outside claim, the approach outlined above provides the
bankruptcy court with the opportunity to protect its own interests
where necessary.
2. The Corporate Scenario
In general, there is less concern regarding a corporation
bringing an undisclosed cause of action in the context of a Chapter 7
bankruptcy because, unlike the individual, Chapter 7 does not
discharge the debts of a corporation. 234 Rather, under Chapter 7, all
assets are distributed, leaving only a shell with the corporate debts.
Cases such as Coastal Plains,235 however, illustrate the judicial
232. See Phillips & Brown, supra note 7.
233. Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, No. 03C1942, 2004 WL 407014 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2004) (noting
that a trustee might choose to abandon a debtor's employment discrimination cause of action as
a contingent asset of inconsequential value).
234. In re Goodman, 873 F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code
"makes it quite clear that while individuals may be discharged of their debts pursuant to
Chapter 7, corporations may not"), overruled on other grounds, Germain v. Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, 926 F.2d 191 (2d Cir.1991).
235. Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1999)
(discussed supra Part IV.A.2).
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estoppel issues that can arise when undisclosed and unspecified
corporate causes of action are sold as intangibles in a Chapter 7
liquidation and then repurchased by the original corporate owners
through a new organizational entity.
By operation of statute, under Chapter 7, the estate retains all
claims, disclosed or otherwise. Following an estate sale of general
intangibles including causes of action, however, the language of the
relevant disclosures and instruments of sale factor into determining
whether and to what extent the sale transfers assets which the
corporation failed to disclose. If a sale did not effectively transfer the
cause of action out of the estate due to fraud or other factors, any
party other than the estate would lack standing to assert the cause of
action as outlined above.
Where a proper sale does effectively transfer undisclosed
causes of action to a third party, standing is no longer an issue and
judicial estoppel may again come into play. As a preliminary matter,
the burden would lie with the defendant to establish that the
corporate entity sought to be estopped is the same as or sufficiently
similar to the entity within the requirements of judicial estoppel. In
the event that this can be established, the standard intent-focused
judicial estoppel analysis would apply. In such a scenario, however,
the creditors' interest would be protected as the original proceeds
garnered from the proper sale of the cause of action would have been
distributed to the creditors by the Chapter 7 trustee.
B. Chapter 11 Nondisclosures
When the debtor-in-possession seeks to pursue an unscheduled
claim prior to confirmation on behalf of the bankruptcy estate there is
no discernable intent to conceal the claim and thus no cause to invoke
judicial estoppel. As the debtor-in-possession is acting in place of the
trustee and the bankruptcy case remains pending, the court should
merely ensure that the bankruptcy schedule is supplemented to reflect
the undisclosed claim. No case law presents the rather implausible
scenario in which a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession would somehow
seek to improperly pursue an undisclosed cause of action exclusively
for its own benefit prior to confirmation of a plan. As a result, a
debtor-in-possession's pursuit of an undisclosed cause of action prior
to confirmation is almost by definition without culpable motive, since
no debt will have yet been discharged. Consequently, no bankruptcy




When the debtor-in-possession emerges from Chapter 11 post-
confirmation as a newly reorganized entity and seeks to pursue a
cause of action undisclosed in bankruptcy, however, a culpable motive
may be evident. At the outset, the court must determine whether the
Chapter 11 debtor has standing to prosecute such a cause of action
post-confirmation. Based on the statutory text that vests "all of the
property of the estate in the debtor"236 at confirmation as well as the
case law emphasizing that provision, a court should hold that a
Chapter 11 debtor has standing to pursue an undisclosed claim.
23 7
The court should, however, heed the implications of 11 U.S.C. §
1141(c) which has been interpreted to indicate that, even though
property rights may vest in the debtor upon confirmation,
unadministered and undisclosed assets, such as unscheduled causes of
action, remain subject to claims by creditors and other interested
parties. 238 To ensure that the cause of action is administered fairly
and efficiently, the court should order a stay to permit the debtor to
petition the bankruptcy court to reopen the case and add the cause of
action.
The bankruptcy court again, as in the Chapter 7 scenario,
serves a gatekeeper function of eliminating frivolous or harassing
causes of action. It is also positioned to protect its own integrity and
guard against litigant manipulation by ordering dismissal, revocation
of discharge, or other remedies. Again, however, the bankruptcy court
should tend to favor reopening such cases to best serve the interests of
unpaid creditors. Upon reopening the case, the court will have several
options for directing the administration of the cause of action. In the
event that creditors yet remain to benefit from the undisclosed cause
of action, the court may require simply that the asset be added to an
existing liquidating trust to be administered for the creditors' benefit.
Alternatively, the court may appoint a trustee to administer the claim
on behalf of the estate. Finally, the court may permit the debtor to
236. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (2006).
237. See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 422 (Stapleton, J.,
dissenting) (finding that allowing the suit to proceed would be in the best interest of all
creditors); Phoenix Petroleum Co. v. United States, No. 98-5124, 1999 WL 521189, at *6 (Fed.
Cir. July 23, 1999) (opining that "[iun our view, such an assurance would ensue most efficiently
by ordering a stay of the proceedings so as to allow plaintiff to petition the bankruptcy court");
Greenhart Durawoods, Inc. v. PHF Int'l. Corp., No. 91 Civ. 3731, 1994 WL 652434, at *2-5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994) (allowing debtor to pursue an undisclosed claim); Winmark Ltd. v. Miles
& Stockbridge, 693 A.2d 824, 829-30 (Md. 1997) (finding that a case allowing a defense of lack of
standing did not consider the interests of creditors).
238. Phoenix Petroleum, 1999 WL 521189, at *6 ("[The 'free and clear' provision of section
1141(c) may more appropriately be given effect by allowing the plaintiff to proceed with the claim
so long as steps are taken to ensure that the claim does not remain free and clear of all claims
and interests of the creditors.").
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prosecute the cause of action himself for the benefit of the remaining
creditors. In such a scenario, the reorganization plan would need to be
amended to reflect proper distribution of the contingent asset. As in
Coastal Plains, when the defendant in the outside action is also the
primary unpaid creditor, the bankruptcy court must facilitate a
determination of whether it is in the estate's interest to pursue the
claim or to abandon it.239
Whether and to what extent the debtor may be permitted to
profit from an undisclosed cause of action, however, should be
governed by the principles examined in the judicial estoppel inquiry.
In analyzing the issue, the court should apply the general two-pronged
intent inquiry to determine whether the company had both knowledge
of the claim and a motive to conceal it. As courts have demonstrated a
willingness to apply the knowledge requirement broadly, it will be
difficult for a debtor to demonstrate lack of intent, especially if the
plan calls for some amount of discharge of indebtedness. In the rare
instance that all creditors are fully paid, however, sanctions are
unwarranted. The interests of creditors and company equity holders
are likely best served by allowing the case to go forward without
burdening the bankruptcy mechanism. Again, in such an instance
when the debtor would not have benefited or possessed motive to
conceal the cause of action, permitting the debtor to proceed with the
action does not undermine the disclosure requirement.
More likely, the court will determine that the Chapter 11
debtor improperly concealed its cause of action. In such an instance,
the court should fashion a remedy that punishes the debtor but does
not strip away the rights of creditors. As courts have announced, but
not adequately applied, judicial estoppel should not be employed
unless it is "tailored to address the harm identified" and "no lesser
sanction would adequately remedy the damage done by the litigant's
misconduct."240  As one court suggested, 18 U.S.C. § 152 exists
specifically as an alternative means to punish debtors who conceal
assets in Chapter 11 cases. 241 In addition, other remedies such as
revoking discharge for "fraud on the court" Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) can be
applied, eliminating the need to "bend[ judicial estoppel theory to the
purpose. 242
239. In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d at 202-03.
240. Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319
(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Montrose Med. Group Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 772,
779-80 (3d Cir. 2001)).
241. Greenhart Durawoods, 1994 WL 652434, at *5.
242. An-Tze Cheng v. K & S Diversified Invs. (In re An-Tze Cheng), 308 B.R. 448, 462 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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When accounting for the creditors' interest and allowing the
claim to proceed, it is important to fashion a penalty that preserves
the integrity of the judicial system and provides incentives for full
disclosure in bankruptcy. In economic terms, this means imposing a
penalty that pushes the defendant beyond the point of indifference
between disclosing assets to be administered for the benefit of
creditors and improperly concealing these assets. While not always
easily reducible to concrete numbers, this point can be expressed
formulaically as:
C - D = (1 - p) * C + p * (C - X)
C represents the value of the claim, D is any outstanding debt
payable, p is the probability of getting "caught" omitting the claim,
and X is the penalty that creates indifference as to disclosing or not
disclosing. 243  The left side of the equation represents a debtor's
expected gain from properly disclosing and prosecuting the claim, and
the right side represents the expected value of not disclosing the
claim. Clearly, penalizing a nondisclosing debtor merely by directing
that proceeds of the action go to debt repayment, by setting X equal to
D, is insufficient as the debtor will prefer the chance to retain all
proceeds. Depriving the debtor of all benefit of the claim, however, by
setting X equal to C-as would occur by applying judicial estoppel-
may tend to over-deter or, in some scenarios, may even inadequately
deter nondisclosure. Additionally, applying judicial estoppel produces
negative externalities including lost potential value to unpaid
creditors and windfalls accruing to potentially culpable third party
defendants, neither of which are accounted for in this representation.
While preserving the rights of creditors and not letting a third
party defendant off the hook, the court must punish the nondisclosing
debtor sufficiently to signal to others that the disclosure obligations
are worth following. There is no reason, however, that this
punishment need extinguish a viable cause of action. While this
argument supports the view espoused by the Third Circuit that
judicial estoppel should only apply when "tailored to address the harm
identified and no lesser sanction would adequately remedy the
damage done by the litigant's misconduct," it indicates that the
bankruptcy nondisclosure setting virtually never presents such
conditions.244
243. For cases in which indebtedness exceeds the claim value, C and D are set equal.
244. Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319.
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C. Chapter 13 Nondisclosures
Much like the debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 case, the
Chapter 13 individual debtor retains standing to pursue causes of
actions possessed by the estate. 245 As outlined, courts have generally
concluded, at least implicitly, that this also includes causes of action
undisclosed by the debtor in his Chapter 13 petition.246 At the outset,
it is significant to note that recent bankruptcy reform legislation
increases the standard Chapter 13 payment period from three to five
years. 247 As a Chapter 13 case remains open during this payment
period, it is exceedingly likely that the debtor would assert any
undisclosed cause of action during the pendency of the Chapter 13
case. As a result, much of the Chapter 11 framework applies equally
here, and judicial estoppel will generally be inappropriate in the
Chapter 13 context as well. Instead, when creditors and the
bankruptcy case remain available, it is likely most efficient to permit
a nondisclosing Chapter 13 debtor to merely amend the schedules and
plan, if necessary, to reflect the undisclosed cause of action.
As in the Chapter 11 scenario, in addition to amending the
debtor's asset schedule to avoid contradictory assertions, the newly
scheduled asset must also be accounted for in the debtor's Chapter 13
payment plan to satisfy potential creditors' interest. Had the debtor's
case been filed or converted to a Chapter 7 filing, the analysis in that
scenario advocates permitting the trustee to pursue the cause of action
on behalf of the estate. By statute, a court cannot approve a Chapter
13 plan that would pay unsecured creditors less than what they would
otherwise receive in the case of a liquidation under Chapter 7.248
Consequently, when the debtor collects on his outside cause of action
prior to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan, the plan must be
amended so that creditors receive at least the distribution to which
they would otherwise be entitled under a Chapter 7 scenario in which
the trustee pursued the outside cause of action. Similarly, where the
245. See, e.g., Olick v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 145 F.3d 513, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1998)
("Although some courts of appeals have held that Chapter 7 debtors have no standing to pursue
causes of actions that belong to the estate ... we reach the contrary holding with respect to
Chapter 13 debtors who pursue such causes of action.").
246. See Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 141 F. App'x 420, 425-28 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying a
judicial estoppel remedy to a Chapter 13 plaintiff that failed to disclose a cause of action in
bankruptcy); De Leon v. Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).
247. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2006).
248. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (providing that "the court shall approve a plan if [inter
alial-the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan
on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on
such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date").
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Chapter 13 plan is to terminate prior to the resolution of the outside
cause of action, the plan again should be adjusted to provide for proper
distribution of the contingent asset.
As posited in the Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession scenario, to
encourage full disclosure from Chapter 13 debtors, courts should
impose some alternative sanction tailored to address the fraud where
a debtor is found to have intentionally omitted disclosure under the
standard two-pronged analysis. As outlined in In re An-Tze Cheng,
possible remedies include revoking discharge for fraud on the court
under Federal Rule 60(b) or levying other fines and sanctions against
the debtor at the court's discretion. 249 Such remedies would serve the
interests of creditors while simultaneously upholding the importance
of the disclosure requirements and keeping the culpable third party
defendant on the hook in the subsequent proceeding.
249. See An-Tze Cheng v. K & S Diversified Invs. (In re An-Tze Cheng), 308 B.R. 448, 462
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (discussing alternatives to judicial estoppel).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis illustrates the inefficiencies and
shortcomings of broadly applying the heavy-handed remedy of judicial
estoppel in the complex, multi-party bankruptcy nondisclosure setting.
The proposed framework provides a comprehensive balance, tailored
to address the interests advanced by both bankruptcy law and judicial
estoppel. Under the proposed framework, debtors have a disincentive
to conceal claims because debtors are guaranteed to recover less, and
in some cases nothing, by attempting to withhold causes of action from
the bankruptcy estate. This mechanism protects bankruptcy creditors
from the harms of debtor nondisclosure and provides them with the
additional opportunity to benefit from any withheld claim. Finally,
the potentially culpable defendant in the outside action is held
accountable, and the judicial machinery is protected from reaching
incompatible results in separate proceedings. This framework
provides equitable and efficient outcomes for all interests concerned
and enables courts to balance the competing legal objectives in a
principled manner.
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